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 Ball on a Needle:  Hein v. Freedom from Religion Foundation  
 and the Future of Establishment Clause Adjudication 
 
Ira C. Lupu and Robert W. Tuttle1 
 
 Amidst a flurry of controversial decisions in the final days of the 2006-07 Term,2 the 
Supreme Court delivered its opinions in Hein v. Freedom from Religion Foundation, Inc.3  For 
several reasons, Hein attracted considerably less attention than the other decisions at Term’s end, 
all of which were seen as manifesting the Court’s general rightward turn.4  First, Hein involved 
the seemingly arcane and relatively inaccessible subject of taxpayer standing to sue in the federal 
courts.  Second, the underlying facts in Hein presented a legally weak and intuitively 
unappealing claim that the federal government had acted unconstitutionally in holding regional 
conferences to promote the President’s Faith-Based and Community Initiative.  This was a 
                                                 
 1  The authors are both on the law faculty of The George Washington University.  Ira C. Lupu is the F. 
Elwood & Eleanor Davis Professor of Law; Robert W. Tuttle is Professor of Law and the David R. and Sherry 
Kirschner Berz Research Professor of Law and Religion. The authors are also Co-Directors of Legal Research for 
the Roundtable on Religion and Social Welfare Policy, a nonpartisan enterprise sponsored by the Pew Charitable 
Trusts and operated by the Nelson A. Rockefeller Institute on State and Local Government, State University of New 
York.   Some of the ideas in this article first appeared in an essay we published immediately after the Hein decision 
on the website of the Roundtable, http://www.religionandsocialpolicy.org/legal/legal_update_display.cfm?id=60.  
The Roundtable’s David Wright provided valuable comments on that essay, and we thank him. The views expressed 
in this article are those of the authors, and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Pew Charitable Trusts or the 
Rockefeller Institute.  We are very grateful to the faculty at Brigham Young University (Fred Gedicks in particular) 
for the opportunity to present this paper at a faculty workshop, where we were confronted with provocative and very 
helpful questions.  We are also grateful to Lane Dilg, Richard Katskee, Dan Mach, and Mark Stern for very useful 
comments on an earlier draft.  The mistakes are ours. 
 2 See, e.g., Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 127 S. Ct. 2738 (2007) (invalidating 
voluntary plans for racial integration of public schools); FEC v. Wis. Right to Life, Inc., 127 S. Ct. 2652 (2007) 
(invalidating portion of Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act); Morse v. Frederick, 127 S. Ct. 2618 (2007) (upholding 
disciplinary action against secondary school student for displaying sign with message “BONG HiTS 4 JESUS”) .    
[BB 1.4(d) – this probably doesn’t matter, but the Supreme Court orders them this way, even though both cases were 
decided on the same day]. 
 3 127 S. Ct. 2553 (2007). 
 4  See Linda Greenhouse, In Steps Big and Small, Supreme Court Moved Right, N. Y. TIMES, July 1, 2007, 
at A1; Cass Sunstein, Minimalists vs. Visionaries, WASH. POST, June 28, 2007.  
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lawsuit destined to go nowhere, even if the Supreme Court had affirmed the Seventh 
Circuit’s decision to uphold taxpayer standing in the case.5 
   Moreover, the significance of Hein may have been obscured by the fact that the 
Supreme Court splintered into three groups and produced no majority opinion.  In 
rejecting taxpayer standing in this case, Justice Alito, joined by Chief Justice Roberts and 
Justice Kennedy, relied heavily and explicitly on the character of the challenged 
conferences as executive rather than legislative.6  This, they concluded, served to 
distinguish Hein from Flast v. Cohen,7 the Court’s most prominent precedent in favor of 
taxpayer standing in Establishment Clause cases.8  But none of the other six Justices 
accepted this distinction.  Justices Scalia and Thomas concurred in the result, but rejected 
the plurality’s distinction between executive and legislative spending.9  Instead, they 
joined in a separate opinion that urged the Court to overrule Flast and end what they 
viewed as the anomalous concept of taxpayer standing in Establishment Clause cases.10  
In an opinion by Justice Souter, the four dissenters also repudiated the executive-
legislative distinction on which the plurality opinion rested,11 but the dissenters 
concluded that the Court should affirm the Seventh Circuit’s holding in favor of taxpayer 
                                                 
 5 See id.; Freedom from Religion Found., Inc. v. Chao, 433 F.3d 989 (7th Cir. 2006), rev’d sub 
nom., Hein v. Freedom from Religion Found., Inc., 127 S. Ct. 2553 (2007). 
 6 Hein, 127 S. Ct. at 2567–71. 
 7 392 U.S. 83 (1968). 
 
8 Hein, 127 S. Ct. at 2568. 
 
9  Id. at 2579–81. 
 10 Id. at 2573–74, 2582–84 (Scalia, J., joined by Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment). 
 11 Id. at 2584–88 (Souter, J., joined by Ginsburg, Breyer, & Stevens, JJ., dissenting). 
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standing.12 
 Far more than may appear on the surface, the outcome and opinions in Hein are 
likely to reverberate heavily through the process of Establishment Clause adjudication.  
Indeed, the fall-out from Hein was quick and dramatic:   
 1) A few days after releasing Hein, the Supreme Court vacated and remanded for 
reconsideration a decision which had permitted taxpayers to seek an order to the 
University of Notre Dame to reimburse the United States for funds that allegedly had 
been spent in violation of the Establishment Clause.13  The challenged program had 
ended, and the case would have been moot but for the highly controversial 
reimbursement remedy authorized by the appellate court.14 
 2) That same week, the Department of Justice invoked Hein in asking the  
Seventh Circuit to dismiss an appeal involving a taxpayer challenge to the Veterans’ 
Administration’s policies and practices concerning chaplains in VA hospitals.15   Prior to 
the Court’s opinion in Hein, the government had defended the VA case on its merits, and 
                                                 
 12 Id. at 2588. 
 13  Univ. of Notre Dame v.  Laskowski, 127 S. Ct. 3051 (2007) (vacating and remanding, for 
reconsideration in light of Hein, Laskowski v. Spellings, 443 F. 3d 930 ( 7th Cir. 2006)). 
 14 Laskowski, 443 F. 3d at 934.  A similar order of restitution, entered in Americans United for 
Separation of Church and State v. Prison Fellowship Ministries, , 432 F. Supp. 2d 862 (S.D. Iowa, 2006), is 
now being challenged on appeal in the  Eighth Circuit. 
 15 Claire Hughes, Lawsuit Targeting Faith-Based Prison Program Becomes “Hein Fatality,” 
ROUNDTABLE ON RELIGION AND SOCIAL WELFARE POLICY, July 10, 2007, 
http://www.religionandsocialpolicy.org/news/article.cfm?id=6740 (describing post Hein filing by the 
Department of Justice in icholson).  The government’s brief in the appeal to the Seventh Circuit in 
icholson devotes substantial attention to the argument that Hein undoes the basis for federal taxpayer 
standing in the case.  Brief for Appellees R. James Nicholson et. al., No. 07-1292, available at 
http://www.ca7.uscourts.gov/efn/efns.fwx?caseno=07-1292&submit=showdkt&yr=07&num=1292.  We 
discuss icholson further in Section V.B. 
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had not bothered to challenge the taxpayer plaintiffs’ standing in the district court.16 
 3)   Several weeks later, the Freedom from Religion Foundation (“FFRF”) 
abandoned its twenty-month old lawsuit against a faith-based rehabilitation program in 
the New Mexico prison after the district court judge indicated that he was likely to 
dismiss the case for lack of taxpayer standing.17 
 4) In late July, in Doe v. Tangipahoa Parish School District,18 a narrowly (8-7) 
and bitterly divided Fifth Circuit decided en banc  to dismiss on standing grounds a 
lawsuit that challenged the practice of beginning local school board meetings with a 
prayer.  The Tangipahoa case did not involve taxpayer standing; instead, the plaintiff’s 
standing had rested on allegations of attendance at school board meetings by a parent 
whose children were enrolled in the local public schools.19  The en banc majority ruled 
that those allegations had been neither proven, nor made subject to an express stipulation 
of agreed-upon facts.  The en banc court (sua sponte) vacated the panel decision in the 
plaintiff’s favor, and remanded with an order to dismiss the case.20  Concurring in the en 
banc ruling, Judge DeMoss invoked Hein and expressly criticized the Supreme Court for 
pretending to apply the same standing rules to all cases while in fact tolerating a 
considerably lower threshold of Article III injury in Establishment Clause cases.21  Such a 
posture, he said, “opens the courts’ doors to a group of plaintiffs who have no complaint 
                                                 
16  Freedom from Religion Found., Inc. v. Nicholson, 469 F. Supp. 2d 609, 616-17 (W.D. Wis. 
2007) (listing defendant’s arguments). 
 17 Hughes, supra note 17. 
   18 494 F.3d 494 (5th Cir. 2007).  We discuss the case in depth in Part VII, infra.  
 19 Id. at 497. 
 
20 Id. at 499. 
 21 Id. at 500 (DeMoss, J., specially concurring). 
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other than they dislike any government reference to God.”22 
 5) In late October, the Seventh Circuit relied explicitly on Hein to dismiss a 
challenge by Indiana taxpayers to the practice of religious invocations before each 
session of the Indiana House of Representatives.  In Hinrichs v. Speaker of the House of 
Representatives of the Indiana General Assembly,23 Judge Ripple’s opinion for a 2-1 
majority ruled that the involvement of the House in the prayer practice, through its own 
rules and minor expenditures, could not support taxpayer standing.24 
 These rapid developments demonstrate that Hein portends something quite 
important.  In Establishment Clause cases, litigants have long understood standing 
doctrines as expansive and have contested standing with infrequent success.  After Hein, 
the issue of standing is likely to become an active battleground.  While the majority of 
lower courts may ultimately treat Hein as a narrow exception to the Flast rule, some may 
instead view Hein as an invitation to narrow considerably the access  that Establishment 
Clause plaintiffs have to the federal courts.  Moreover, such a narrowing may extend 
beyond the specialized field of taxpayer standing to more general doctrines under which, 
as Judge DeMoss suggests, plaintiffs in Establishment Clause cases have been granted 
standing without having suffered any injury traditionally recognized under Article III.   
 The fall-out from the sudden appearance of new and sharp limitations on standing 
                                                 
 22 Id.  
 
23  2007 U.S. App. LEXIS 25363 (7th Cir., Oct. 30, 2007).  The lower court had enjoined the 
practice of sectarian prayer in these invocations, including specifically the use in the prayer of “Christ’s 
name or title or any other denominational appeal.” Id. at *9, n. 3.  The opinion of the district court, which 
had expressly found that the plaintiff-taxpayers had standing to maintain the claim, is reported at Hinrichs 
v. Bosma, 400 F. Supp. 2d 1103 (SD Ind 2005). 
 
24 We discuss Hinrichs in detail in Part V.C., infra.  For a sign of pre-Hein movement in the 
direction of limiting taxpayer standing, see Winkler v. Gates, 481 F.3d 977 (7th Cir. 2007) (taxpayers lack 
standing to bring Establishment Clause challenge to the Boy Scouts of America Jamboree Act because the 
Act did not rest primarily on the congressional power to tax and spend). 
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to sue in Establishment Clause cases is potentially greater than might be the case with 
other constitutional provisions.  Although some Establishment Clause violations are 
accompanied by injuries of a more conventional sort,25 a great many Establishment 
Clause plaintiffs allege injuries that fit uncomfortably at best within conventional Article 
III standards.  In addition to claims by taxpayers, courts have granted standing to 
challenge public religious displays to those whose ordinary paths bring them into contact 
with these displays.26  Because in many circumstances such people could rather easily 
avert their eyes or ears, the injury caused by these displays is primarily psychological – 
the distress caused by knowledge that the government promotes a religious sentiment.  It 
is unimaginable that courts would adjudicate claims of psychological injury by observers 
of other constitutional wrongs, such as cruel punishments or patently unfair trials.  
Establishment Clause standing doctrines are looser than most, for the prudential reason 
that the Clause would not be judicially enforced if traditional Article III rules applied.27 
 The result of this historical looseness in the justiciability of Establishment Clause 
claims is that the substantive gloss on the Clause now resembles a large ball resting on a 
                                                 
 25 See, e.g., Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577 (1992) (student required to passively participate in 
school-sponsored prayer as condition of attendance at her middle school commencement may challenge 
constitutionality of prayer). 
 26 See, e.g., McCreary County v. ACLU of Kentucky, 545 U.S. 844 (2005); Van Orden v. Perry, 
545 U.S. 677 (2005).  See also ACLU v. Rabun City Chamber of Commerce, 698 F.2d 1098, 1107 (11th 
Cir. 1983); Saladin v. City of Milledgeville, 812 F.2d 687, 692 (11th Cir. 1982); Pelphrey v. Cobb County, 
448 F. Supp. 2d 1357 (N.D. Ga. 2006). 
 27 The subject of justiciability in general, and standing to sue in particular, has produced a vast 
amount of literature.  We do not in this piece address the full set of theoretical concerns that underlie the 
requirement that federal courts decide only “cases and controversies.”  For worthwhile efforts at that 
enterprise, see, e.g., Jonathan Siegel, A Theory Of Justiciability, 86 TEX. L. REV. (forthcoming 2007); Cass 
Sunstein, What’s Standing After Lujan? Of Citizen Suits, Injuries, and Article III, 91 MICH. L. REV.  163 
(1992); William A. Fletcher, The Structure of Standing, 98 YALE L.J. 221 (1988); Antonin Scalia, The 
Doctrine of Standing as an Essential Element of the Separation of Powers, 17 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 881, 
884 (1983); Henry P. Monaghan, Constitutional Adjudication:  The Who and When, 82 YALE L.J. 1363, 
1365 (1973); Daniel Farber, A Place-BasedTheory of Standing(UC Berkeley Public Law Research Paper 
No. 1013084, 2007), available at http://papers.ssrn.om/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1013084. 
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very thin needle.  If the Court – and the lower courts following its lead – were to 
suddenly retreat from this expansive treatment of the justiciability of such claims, judicial 
monitoring of religion-promoting activity by government might slow down considerably.  
Whether or not the ball of substantive doctrine toppled entirely off that needle, the 
incentive structure facing governments that sought to engage in religion-promoting 
activity would change radically in a world in which litigation could be easily blocked 
short of reaching the merits.  In that legal milieu, litigation might eventually dry up, 
liberating government to act without fear of disruptive injunctions and awards of 
attorneys’ fees to prevailing plaintiffs.  Whether state courts might pick up some of the 
resulting slack is an intriguing question, full of subtleties. 
 Thus, the meta-question looming after Hein is the relationship between the 
substance of the Establishment Clause and the justiciability of claims arising under the 
Clause.  Under the broad standing doctrines that have governed for the past several 
decades, the gap between substance and justiciability is relatively narrow.  Although 
some religion-promoting acts of government may remain outside the reach of the courts, 
a generous approach to standing has permitted adjudication of most asserted violations of 
the Establishment Clause.  If doctrines of standing narrow dramatically, however, the gap 
between substance and justiciability will grow, creating the possibility of severe 
constitutional tensions.  
 Our primary purposes in this paper are to expose, analyze, and critique that 
potential gap.  The piece begins with a focus on Hein itself.  Part I describes the litigation 
on its path to the Supreme Court, and Part II outlines the arguments and conclusions 
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offered in the Court’s opinions. 
 The remainder of the piece analyzes what Hein may signal for the future.  Part III 
discusses which opinion in Hein is controlling, and explores the role of stare decisis in 
Hein and its aftermath.  Part IV explores the relationship between the question of whether 
the Establishment Clause is constitutionally exceptional, and the doctrines of 
justiciability that correspond to the competing answers to that question.  Part V maps 
with particularity the ways in which lower courts are likely to apply Hein in future cases 
involving taxpayer standing; among other things, Part V distinguishes the easy from the 
difficult post-Hein cases, and addresses the special problems associated with the standing 
of state and local taxpayers.  In light of concerns brought out in Part V, Part VI explores 
the incentive effects of Hein’s intense focus on the legislative-executive distinction, and 
identifies problems that may arise if that distinction determines the status of plaintiffs.  
Part VII addresses non-taxpayer standing in Establishment Clause cases, including both 
funding cases and cases about government religious speech.  In addressing the latter 
category, Part VII returns to the explosive hints, reflected in Doe v. Tangipahoa Parish 
School District, that Hein’s gloss on Article III and the Establishment Clause may spill 
outside of taxpayer standing to other settings for litigation under the Clause.  Part VIII 
adds a brief note on the potential role of state courts if and when Article III doctrines 
become altered in ways that tend to silence the federal courts in Establishment Clause 
cases. 
I.  THE LITIGATION BACKGROUND OF HEI V. FREEDOM FROM RELIGIO FOUDATIO, IC.   
 The litigation in Hein v. FFRF arose out of a series of regional conferences, co-
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sponsored by the White House Office of Faith-Based and Community Initiatives 
(“WHOFBCI”) and several executive branch agencies,28 designed to promote the Faith-
Based and Community Initiative (“FBCI”).29  The government invited representatives of 
non-profit groups, both religious and secular, to attend these conferences and learn about 
federally funded opportunities to receive grants for social services.  Acting on behalf of 
its federal taxpayer-members, FFRF brought suit in the federal district court for the 
Western District of Wisconsin against James Towey, then the Director of the WHOFBCI, 
and several executive branch officers whose agencies had co-sponsored the regional 
conferences.  Among other things, FFRF’s complaint alleged that the conferences 
involved the expenditure of government funds to endorse and promote religion.  The 
alleged methods of endorsement included speeches, laudatory of religion-based social 
services, by Cabinet officers at the conferences.30  
 The government defendants moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground that 
the taxpayer-plaintiffs lacked standing to bring the suit.  In resisting this motion, FFRF 
relied on a line of precedent, beginning with Flast v. Cohen.31  Flast had upheld a 
taxpayer suit, resting on the Establishment Clause, brought to enjoin expenditures under a 
program enacted by Congress pursuant to its power in Article I, Section 8, Clause 1, to 
tax and spend for the general welfare of the United States.  The Court in Flast had 
explained that there was a “logical nexus” among taxpayer status, suits against 
                                                 
 28 These included the Departments of Health & Human Services, Labor, and Education. 
 
29 Hein v. Freedom from Religion Found., Inc., 127 S. Ct. 2553, 2559 (2007). 
 
30 Id. at 2559. 
 31 392 U.S. 83 (1968). 
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expenditures made pursuant to Article I, Section 8, Clause 1, and historical concerns 
concerning the coercion of taxpayers to support religion.32  Flast represents a 
conceptually solitary exception to the otherwise pervasive and long-standing rule against 
recognizing the standing of federal taxpayers to challenge the constitutionality of 
government expenditures.33 
 The government relied primarily on a contrary precedent, Valley Forge Christian 
College v. Americans United for Separation of Church and State,34 which had rejected 
taxpayer standing in cases of executive transfer of real property, rather then expenditure 
of funds.   The Court in Valley Forge reasoned that the executive transfer of property 
arose from the congressional power in Article IV, Section 3, Clause 2, to “dispose of . . . 
the Property belonging to the United States,” rather than the Article I power to tax and 
spend, and therefore did not fall within the Flast exception.35    
 The district court granted the government’s motion to dismiss.36  The court 
                                                 
 32 Id. at 102–04.  As Chief Justice Warren put it, “Our history vividly illustrates that one of the 
specific evils feared by those who drafted the Establishment Clause . . . was that the taxing and spending 
power would be used to favor one religion over another or to support religion in general.”  Id. at 103–04 & 
n.24 (discussing James Madison’s experience in opposing a proposed tax in Virginia for supporting 
teachers of the Christian religion). 
 33 The rule finds its genesis in Frothingham v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447 (1923) and had been very 
recently reaffirmed in DaimlerChrysler Corp.v. Cuno, 126 S. Ct. 1854 (2006). 
 34 454 U.S. 464 (1982). 
 
35 Id. at 466 (quoting U.S. CONST. art. IV,  §3, cl. 2) & 480. Later, in Bowen v. Kendrick, 487 U.S. 
589 (1988), the Court reaffirmed the standing of taxpayers to challenge executive agency grants to religious 
entities, because a congressional decision to tax and spend for religion-based social services was the 
predicate for the grant program. 
 36 The Memorandum and Order of Dismissal, dated Nov. 15, 2005, is unreported, but is mentioned 
in a subsequent installment of the litigation, Freedom from Religion Found., Inc. v. Towey, 2005 U.S. Dist 
LEXIS 39444, at *1–*2 (W.D. Wisc. Jan. 11, 2005).  For a discussion on the dismissal order, see Ira C. 
Lupu & Robert W. Tuttle, Freedom from Religion Foundation, Inc. (and others) v. Jim Towey, Director of 
White House Office of Faith Based and Community Initiatives (and others), ROUNDTABLE ON RELIGION 
AND SOCIAL WELFARE POLICY,  Nov. 22, 2004, 
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concluded that the conferences were activities for which the Executive Branch, rather 
than Congress, was primarily responsible.  Relying on the Supreme Court’s opinion in 
Valley Forge, the district court ruled that taxpayer standing did not extend to the situation 
described in FFRF’s complaint, even though the FFRF lawsuit involved the expenditure 
of money rather than the transfer of real property.  According to the district court, 
decisions concerning the use of general Executive Branch funds to promote the FBCI – a 
presidential initiative – do not sharply implicate congressional power over the 
expenditure of taxpayers’ dollars.  The Flast exception, allowing taxpayer standing, 
therefore did not apply. 
 FFRF appealed the dismissal to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the  Seventh 
Circuit.   In an opinion authored by Judge Posner, a panel of that court reversed.37  By a 
2-1 vote, the panel concluded that the legislative-executive distinction on which the 
district court had relied was mistaken.38 Congress had appropriated the funds used by the 
WHOFBCI and other federal agencies to sponsor the conferences.  “[Because] the 
program itself is challenged as unconstitutional,” Judge Posner wrote, “the fact that it was 
funded out of general rather than earmarked appropriations-that it was an executive rather 
than a congressional program-does not deprive taxpayers of standing to challenge it. 
Taxpayers have standing to challenge an executive-branch program, alleged to promote 
religion, that is financed by a congressional appropriation, even if the program was 
                                                                                                                                                 
http://www.religionandsocialpolicy.org/legal/legal_update_display.cfm?id=31. 
 37 Freedom from Religion Found., Inc. v. Chao, 433 F.3d 989 (7th Cir. 2006).  Judge Ripple’s 
dissent for the Court of Appeals panel argued that allowing taxpayers to challenge expenditures should be 
rare and exceptional.  Because the expenses complained of in FFRF’s lawsuit were not properly attributable 
to specific congressional decisions about the FBCI, Judge Ripple concluded that taxpayers should not be 
free to bring lawsuits challenging them as outside of Congress’ power to tax and spend.  Id. at 997-1001 
(Ripple, J. dissenting). 
 
38 Id. at 996–97 (majority opinion). 
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created entirely within the executive branch, as by Presidential executive order.>”39    
 Judge Posner recognized that his ruling could lead to taxpayer standing to 
challenge virtually every religion-promoting action taken by the executive branch, 
because congressional appropriations always support those actions – at the very least, in 
the salaries of the relevant executive personnel.40  Judge Posner thus limited the panel’s 
ruling to cases in which the marginal cost of the alleged constitutional violation was 
greater than zero.41  Under this rule, for example, a taxpayer could not challenge a 
favorable reference to God in a Presidential speech, because the speech would cost 
taxpayers no less without that reference.  Thus, under Posner’s suggested rule, FFRF had 
standing because the conferences as a whole allegedly promoted religion and added 
identifiable costs to the FBCI.42  
 The government petitioned the full Seventh Circuit to rehear the case en banc .  
The circuit court denied the petition,43 but several judges wrote opinions that complained 
of the uncertainty in current principles of taxpayer standing, and pleaded for the Supreme 
Court to clarify those principles in this or some other case.44  The government 
successfully petitioned the Supreme Court to hear the case. 
                                                 
39 Id. at 996-97.  See also id. at 993-94. 
 40 Id. at 995–97. 
 41 Id. at 995–96. 
 42 Id. at 996–97. 
 43 Freedom from Religion Found., Inc. v. Chao, 447 F.3d 988 (7th Cir. 2006). 
 44  Judges Flaum and Easterbrook concurred in the denial of rehearing, but they argued that 
taxpayer standing principles were in disarray, and they expressed the hope that the government would 
petition for Supreme Court review, and that the Court would accept the petition and clarify the governing 
principles.  Id. at 988 (Flaum, J. concurring); Id. at 989–90 (Easterbrook, J., concurring).  Judge Ripple 
dissented from the denial of rehearing, and argued that the panel had erred.   Id. at 990–91 (Ripple, J. 
dissenting).  
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 The United States argued the case on very narrow grounds.  Unlike some amicus 
filings, which urged the Court to overrule Flast v. Cohen and do away entirely with 
taxpayer standing in Establishment Clause cases,45 the government argued that FFRF’s 
case was distinguishable from Flast in two important ways.  First, the government 
emphasized the district court’s reasoning in dismissing the case; that is, that the 
expenditure had resulted from discretionary decisions by the Executive Branch, rather 
than from any specific authorization by Congress to promote the FBCI.46 Second, the 
government argued that taxpayer standing should be limited to expenditures to non-
governmental third parties, such as religious organizations.47  The conferences were 
internal administrative expenses, which the government asserted should be left outside 
the scope of the rule in Flast.   
 FFRF challenged the relevance of both of these distinctions.   First, it argued that 
all executive branch spending is attributable to congressional appropriations, and 
therefore necessarily involves the exercise of congressional power to tax and spend.48  In 
addition, FFRF challenged the distinction between external and internal expenditures; the 
harm to taxpayers resulting from government spending to promote religion is identical, 
FFRF argued, regardless of whether the Executive Branch engaged in the promotion, or 
                                                 
 45 Among others, the American Center for Law and Justice filed an amicus brief, which argued for 
the Court to overrule Flast.  Amicus Brief of the American Center for Law and Justice at 4-14, Hein v. 
Freedom from Religion Found., Inc., 127 S. Ct. 2553 (2007) (No. 06-157). 
 46 Brief for the Petitioners Jay Hein et al., Hein v. Freedom from Religion Foundation, Inc., U.S. 
Supreme Court Docket No. No. 06–157, at 26–38. 
 47 Id. at 38–45. 
 48 Brief for the Respondent Freedom from Religion Foundation, Inc., Hein v. Freedom from 
Religion Foundation, Inc., U.S. Supreme Court Docket No. No. 06–157, at 22–35. 
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paid someone else to engage in the same activity.49  FFRF’s brief proposed that the limit 
on taxpayer standing be that the challenged expense be “fairly traceable to the conduct 
alleged to violate the Establishment Clause.”50 
 II.  THE HEI OPINIONS 
 The Court in Hein splintered into three groups, and produced no majority opinion.  
The first group, represented by Justice Alito’s plurality opinion for himself, Chief Justice 
Roberts, and Justice Kennedy (hereafter “the Alito group”), accepted the government’s 
basic argument that taxpayer standing depended on whether the target of the suit was a 
decision by Congress to tax and spend in support of religion.  The starting premise for the 
Alito group was that standing to sue, under Article III’s limitation of the federal judicial 
power to “cases” and “controversies,” depends upon the plaintiff demonstrating that he or 
she has been personally injured in a way that is “traceable to the defendant’s allegedly 
unlawful conduct and likely to be redressed by the . . . relief [requested from the 
court].”51  Ordinarily, taxpayers lack standing to complain of the alleged illegality of an 
expenditure because the complaint of illegal spending involves a grievance that all 
taxpayers share in common, and therefore is not “personal” to the plaintiff.   In addition, 
a favorable ruling does not result in the return of any misspent money to the complaining 
taxpayer. 
 As the Alito group recognized, however, the Court in Flast had created an 
exception to that general rule against taxpayer standing, and had held that taxpayers in 
                                                 
 49 Id. at 42–46. 
 50 Id. at 17. 
 51 127 S. Ct. at 2562 (quoting Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 751 (1984)). 
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some circumstances have standing to assert that an exercise of Congress’ Article I power 
to tax and spend violates the Establishment Clause.  Flast involved an act of Congress, 
passed in 1965, authorizing aid to public and private schools (both elementary and 
secondary) that educated low-income students.  The Alito group argued that Congress, in 
light of the demography of private schools, “surely understood that much of the aid 
mandated by the statute would find its way to religious schools.”52 
 The Alito group emphasized that the Flast exception should be narrowly 
construed in order to preserve the integrity of the underlying rule against taxpayer 
standing.  The facts in Hein revealed no specific appropriations by Congress for creation 
of the WHOFBCI, the agency centers on the FBCI, or the conferences to promote the 
FBCI.  Instead, the Office of the President had made an independent decision to initiate 
the FBCI,53 and had used general, discretionary budget authority for administrative 
expenses to support the WHOFBCI, the agency centers, and the conferences.  On those 
facts, the Alito group concluded, taxpayers lack standing to complain that the 
expenditures violate the Constitution, because the expenditures lack the sufficient nexus, 
required by Flast, to a congressional decision to spend.54  The Alito group thus ruled in 
the government’s favor, and proclaimed that it was doing so without changing the pre-
existing norms of taxpayer standing.55   
                                                 
 52 Id. at 2565, n. 3. 
 
53 Executive Order No. 13,199, 3 C.F.R. 752 (2002). 
 54 127 S. Ct. at 2566. 
 55 Id. at 2571–72.  The Alito opinion suggested that potential constitutional abuses by the 
Executive Branch acting alone might be challengeable by “plaintiffs who would possess standing on a basis 
other than taxpayer standing.”  Id. at 2571.  Presumably, the FBCI Conerences might have been challenged 
by those who were present at the Conferences and therefore exposed to the alleged religious promotion, but 
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 To buttress its case that the Flast exception was and should remain very narrow, 
the Alito group argued that prior case law had never extended taxpayer standing to any 
claim other than one based on the Establishment Clause,56 and that the Court had 
essentially confined Flast to its own facts of knowing and specific authorization by 
Congress of expenditures in aid of religious organizations.57  The Alito group made 
evident that it thought the result in Flast was highly questionable, but nevertheless 
concluded that “[w]e do not extend Flast, but we also do not overrule it.  We leave Flast 
as we found it.”58 
 Justice Kennedy joined the Alito opinion, but added a concurring opinion in 
which he emphasized that lawsuits like this one would intrude significantly on the day-to-
day conduct of the Executive Branch.59   On the allegations in this case, for example, 
courts would have to undertake discovery and a possible trial on questions of exactly 
what had been said at each of the regional conferences for the FBCI.  Kennedy argued 
that this sort of judicial supervision of the day-to-day speech and conduct of executive 
officials violated concerns of power separation within the federal government.60  
Kennedy’s opinion thus expands on a rationale that the Alito group mentions without 
                                                                                                                                                 
FFRF did not include such a plaintiff in this lawsuit.  The Alito opinion ignores the government’s argument 
that taxpayer standing depends upon the expenditure going to non-governmental entities, such as religious 
organizations. 
 56 Id. at 2569. 
 57  Id. at 2568–69. 
 58  Id. at 2571–72. 
 59 Id. at 2572–73 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
 60 Id.  Justice Kennedy here built on a theme that the Court had elaborated more fully in Lujan v. 
Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 559–60 (1992).  He also stressed this theme in his opinion for the 
Court in Garcetti v. Ceballos, 126 S.Ct. 1951, 1961 (2006). 
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elaboration.61 Unlike the Alito group, which had described Flast v. Cohen with some 
disdain,62 Justice Kennedy’s opinion proclaimed that Flast had been correctly decided.63  
Nevertheless, because Kennedy’s explicitly states that he joins the Alito opinion “in full,” 
Kennedy’s opinion does not purport to narrow or broaden the standing rules that lower 
courts should apply in the wake of Hein. 
 Six of the nine Justices rejected the Alito group’s distinction between legislative 
and executive branch decisions, but these six divided into two diametrically opposed 
camps.  Justice Scalia, joined by Justice Thomas (hereafter the “Scalia group”), wrote an 
opinion concurring in the judgment.64  The Scalia group agreed with the plurality opinion 
that taxpayers lacked standing to sue over expenditures by the Executive Branch to 
promote the FBCI, and thus brought the number of Justices who ruled in favor of the 
government to five.  But the Scalia group argued that Flast v. Cohen was wrongly 
decided and should be overruled;65 that is, that taxpayers should not be free to sue over 
expenditures that allegedly transgressed Establishment Clause limits, regardless of which 
branch of government is responsible for those expenditures. 
 The Scalia opinion makes a distinction between taxpayer suits that involve 
“Wallet Injury,”66 in which taxpayers claim that their tax liability is higher than it would 
                                                 
 61 127 S. Ct. at 2569–70. 
 62 Id. at 2568–69. 
 63 Id. at 2572 (“In my view the result reached in Flast is correct and should not be called into 
question.”). 
 64 Id. at 2573–84 (Scalia, J., joined by Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment). 
 65 Id. at 2584 (“I can think of few cases less warranting of stare decisis respect.  It is time – it is 
past time – to call an end.  Flast should be overruled.”). 
 66 Id. at 2574. 
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be if the illegal expenditure had not been made, and “Psychic Injury,”67 in which 
taxpayers claim that the expenditures cause them some sort of psychic distress.  Courts 
routinely deny standing to complain about “Wallet Injuries,” Justice Scalia argues, 
because of difficulties in tracing the injury to the defendant’s conduct and redressing the 
grievance.68  But “Psychic Injuries” also cannot be “redressed.”  They are generalized 
grievances, shared by many citizens, who are upset because they believe that the law is 
not being followed.69  Courts do not in other circumstances redress “Psychic Injury” 
unaccompanied by material injury, and Justice Scalia argues that courts should not make 
a special exception for the “Psychic Injuries” caused by alleged violations of the 
Establishment Clause.70  Furthermore, according to Justice Scalia, the courts have made 
an illogical mess out of trying to keep the exceptional ruling in Flast v. Cohen within 
logical and reasonable bounds.71   
 Justice Souter, joined by Justices Breyer, Ginsburg, and Stevens (hereafter the 
“Souter group”) agreed completely with the Scalia group that the distinction between 
suits aimed at congressional decisions to spend for religious causes and executive 
decisions of the same sort is illogical.72  But the Souter group argued that the Court 
should achieve logical consistency by permitting taxpayer standing regardless of whether 
                                                 
 67 Id. 
 68 Id. 
 69 Id. at 2574–75. 
 70 Id. at 2575. 
 71 Id. at 2577–2584.  “[W]hat experience has shown,” Justice Scalia contended, “is that Flast’s 
lack of a logical theoretical underpinning has rendered our taxpayer-standing doctrine such a jurisprudential 
disaster that our appellate judges do not know what to make of it.”  Id. at 2584. 
 72 Id. at 2584–2588 (Souter, J., joined by Breyer, Stevens, and Ginsburg, JJ., dissenting). 
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the precise target was a congressional enactment or a discretionary executive decision.73   
The injury to taxpayers is identical in cases where the executive rather than the legislature 
has decided to aid religion.  In both situations, the injury is one to the conscience of 
taxpayers who object to being compelled to support religious opinions or activities.74  
And that injury can be redressed by an order to the Executive Branch to stop making such 
expenditures, which is the remedy that FFRF sought in this litigation.   Accordingly, the 
Souter group concluded that the federal courts should accept FFRF’s standing to 
represent its taxpayer-members in this case.75 
 III.  THE MEANING OF HEI – CONVENTIONS OF INTERPRETATION 
 Whatever the genesis or wisdom of the legislative-executive distinction in Hein, 
the opinions raise vitally important questions about the scope of taxpayer standing in the 
future.  What considerations will guide the lower courts in interpreting and applying these 
opinions in cases yet to come?   In this Part, we discuss the interpretive conventions 
associated with a) Supreme Court decisions that lack majority opinions, and b) the 
application of principles of vertical stare decisis by the lower courts.  In the Part that 
immediately follows, we turn to broader, thematic considerations about the scope of the 
Establishment Clause and the nexus between that scope and doctrines of justiciability. 
A.  Which Opinion Controls? 
Hein lacks a majority opinion, and the Supreme Court’s decision in Marks v. 
                                                 
 73 Id. at 2586. 
 74 Id. at 2585–86. 
 75  Id. at 2588.  If some complaints about executive spending activity are frivolous, the Souter 
group argued, courts will and should reject them as involving no violation of the Constitution.   For those 
that are not frivolous, taxpayers should be able to bring them, and courts should be free to hear them.  
Souter, J., dissenting, id. at 2586, n.1. 
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United States76 instructs lower courts to treat as controlling the narrowest opinion that 
supports the result in the case.  In Hein, the narrowest opinion must either be Justice 
Alito’s or Justice Kennedy’s; Justice Souter’s opinion does not support the result, and 
Justice Scalia’s opinion (urging the overruling of a major precedent) is not narrow at all. 
 One would initially expect the lower courts to follow Justice Alito’s plurality 
opinion.  Justice Kennedy joined the plurality opinion in its entirety,77 and he wrote 
separately in order to amplify the argument about separation of powers, which the 
plurality also noted briefly.  If neither opinion is narrower than the other, lower courts 
will inevitably follow the plurality opinion, because it is far more comprehensive and 
because three Justices joined it.   
 But there is another way of reading Justice Kennedy’s opinion.  He says Flast was 
correct,78 while Alito strongly suggests that Flast was wrong, but is not being overruled 
because a decision in the government’s favor in Hein does not require such overruling.79  
So, arguably, Kennedy’s opinion is “narrower” than Alito’s, because Kennedy’s opinion 
is more respectful of the pre-existing law, as reflected in Flast.  If lower courts rely on 
Kennedy’s opinion, they might be somewhat more generous in their interpretation of the 
scope of Flast, as now modified by Hein.80 
B. Stare Decisis. 
                                                 
 76 Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188 (1977). 
 77 127 S. Ct. at 2572. 
 78 Id. (“In my view the result reached in Flast is correct and should not be called into question.”). 
 79 Id. at 2571–72. 
 80 We expect the lower courts to wrestle over this question of which is the narrowest opinion, 
though we recognize that choosing the Alito opinion over the Kennedy opinion, or vice versa, may not 
make any tangible difference in the outcome of future cases in the lower courts.  
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The practices and attitudes of lower court judges about stare decisis may turn out 
to be very important in the application of Hein to new situations.  Theories of stare 
decisis can be highly abstract,81 but they inevitably encompass the question of how 
narrow or broad a principle can be fairly attributed to a prior case.  Here, the crucial issue 
is the scope of Flast v. Cohen.  Although the Alito opinion says that Flast has been 
“confined to its facts,”82 that assertion cannot be taken literally.  Its “facts” include the 
congressional choice to fund private schools under the Elementary and Secondary 
Schools Act of 1965, and no trained lawyer would think that only cases arising under that 
particular enactment can fall within the principle of Flast.  Any coherent theory of stare 
decisis requires similar treatment for “like” cases, even if the enactment is on another 
subject or has come into being at another time. 
 Accordingly, the real question for lower court judges will be what constitutes a 
case “like” Flast, as glossed by Hein.  On this question, the Alito opinion gives some 
very important clues.  It says, among other things, that “the expenditures at issue in Flast 
                                                 
 81 Stare decisis in constitutional cases is a topic on which there is a vast literature.  Most of the 
work focuses on so-called “horizontal” stare decisis – that is, the obligation of Supreme Court Justices to 
respect prior Supreme Court opinions.  Our focus here is on “vertical” stare decisis – that is, the scope of 
interpretive authority conferred on lower court judges with respect to applying Supreme Court precedent.  
See Michael Dorf, Dicta and Article III, 142 U. PA. L. REV. 1997, 2040 (1994) (arguing that the 
requirements of vertical stare decisis extend to rationales relied upon by the Supreme Court, and not just to 
the outcomes reached by the Court on particular facts).  For a sampling of the work on horizontal stare 
decisis, see Thomas R. Lee, Stare Decisis in Historical Perspective: From the Founding Era to the 
Rehnquist Court, 52 VAND. L. REV. 647 (1999); Larry Alexander & Emily Sherwin, THE RULE OF RULES: 
MORALITY, RULES, AND THE DILEMMAS OF LAW (2001); Frederick Schauer, Precedent, 39 STAN. L. REV. 
571 (1987); Steven G. Calabresi, Overrule Casey!: Some Originalist and ormative Arguments Against 
Stare Decisis in Constitutional Cases, 22 CONST. COMMENT. 311 (2006); Daniel A. Farber, The Rule of 
Law and the Law of Precedents, 90 MINN. L. REV. 1173 (2006); Lawrence B. Solum, The Supreme Court 
in Bondage: Constitutional Stare Decisis, Legal Formalism, and the Future of Unenumerated Rights, 9 U. 
PA. J. CONST. L. 1, 39 (2006); Hon. William O. Douglas, Stare Decisis, 49 COLUM. L. REV. 735 (1949); 
Lewis F. Powell, Jr., Stare Decisis and Judicial Restraint, 47 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 281 (1990); Charles J. 
Cooper, Stare Decisis: Precedent and Principle in Constitutional Adjudication, 73 CORNELL L. REV. 401, 
404 (1988).  
 82 127 S. Ct. at 2568-69. 
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were made pursuant to an express congressional mandate and a specific congressional 
appropriation,”83 and that “Congress surely understood that much of the aid mandated by 
the statute would find its way to religious schools.”84  So the principle assigned to Flast  
by the Alito opinion in Hein is that, in order to support taxpayer standing, the challenged 
expenditure must 1) be made under an express legislative mandate, which 2) includes a 
specific appropriation, that 3) the enacting legislature understood at the time would 
benefit religious entities.   
 The statute in Flast, however, did not expressly specify that religious entities 
would receive grants.  Requiring that degree of legislative specification thus would 
appear to go beyond what was determinative in Flast.  Because the Alito opinion insists 
that its authors chose to leave Flast as they found it, conditioning taxpayer standing on a 
clear and explicit legislative statement—not just a background understanding—that faith-
based organizations will receive funds seems unfaithful to the views of the Alito group.  
A “clear statement” requirement cannot be extracted from the Alito group’s interpretation 
of Flast. 
 Lower court judges with a view of stare decisis that emphasizes the “no-growth, 
no-extension” attitude toward Flast reflected in the Alito opinion may insist that 
taxpayers seeking to challenge a statute on Establishment Clause grounds demonstrate 
that the enacting legislature effectively (even if not explicitly) mandated the inclusion of 
religious entities, and made a specific appropriation that would include such entities, or in 
any event had unequivocal knowledge that religious entities would receive funds under 
                                                 
 83 Id. at 2565. 
 84 Id. at 2565 n.3. 
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the statute.  Moreover, because Flast involved federal taxpayers, some lower court judges 
may be especially reluctant to give the benefit of the Flast exception to state and local 
taxpayers.85  Instead, as suggested in Part V.C. below, the question of state and local 
taxpayer standing may be re-analyzed from the ground up.   
 In contrast, lower court judges inclined to somewhat more generous interpretation 
of still-valid precedents might read Flast as requiring no more than reasonable 
foreseeability (rather than “sure knowledge”) by an enacting legislature that its enacted 
social service programs will include religious entities as grantees.  Moreover, a slightly 
more capacious view of stare decisis could lead lower courts to conclude that a 
subsequent legislative appropriation for a program, under an objective belief that grants 
might thereafter go to faith-based groups, will support taxpayer standing even if the 
legislature had originally enacted the program without such an objective belief, perhaps 
because constitutional law or administrative practice precluded such grants at the time of 
original enactment.  In addition, some judges will conclude that the lower courts have 
been unquestioningly recognizing Flast-type standing for state and local taxpayers since 
196886 and will see nothing in Hein that suggests that state and local taxpayers should 
now be treated differently from federal taxpayers for these purposes. 
IV. THE MEANING OF HEI – ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE EXCEPTIONALISM AND ITS 
RELATION TO JUSTICIABILITY 
 
 In our view, predicting Hein’s path depends upon considerations far deeper than 
those involved in applying the rule in Marks or working out the particulars of vertical 
                                                 
85 See Hinrichs v. Speaker of the House of Representatives of the Indiana General Assembly, 2007 
U.S. App. LEXIS 26363 at *24-*25 (7th Cir., Oct. 30, 2007). 
 86 Cases challenging specific grants of state and local tax monies under the FBCI have all involved 
taxpayer standing.  See, e.g., Ams. United for Separation of Church and State v. Prison Fellowship 
Ministries, 395 F. Supp. 2d 805 (S.D. Iowa, 2005); Freedom from Religion Found., Inc. v. McCallum, 179 
F. Supp. 2d 950 (W.D. Wis. 2002). 
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stare decisis.  Hein v. FFRF engages a pair of enduring and interlocking constitutional 
themes that will be central to further developments.  These themes include the 
exceptionalism of the Establishment Clause as a source of constitutional norms and the 
complex relationship between those norms and considerations of justiciability.  
 The Establishment Clause occupies a unique role within the Bill of Rights.  As 
construed over the past half-century, it frequently involves questions of government voice 
and structure,87 as well as more conventional constitutional concerns about individual 
coercion.  When the Clause is seen as a structural limitation on government, the question 
of what constitutes an “injury” takes on a different coloration than under other Bill of 
Rights provisions, where the notion of personal injury is individuated, material, and far 
easier to see.  In cases involving government display of the Ten Commandments or a 
Christmas Creche,88 for example, the injury to individuals is non-material and typically 
involves a fleeting exposure to an unwanted message.89  The concerns at stake in most 
                                                 
 87 Several of Justice Breyer’s opinions, which emphasize the theme of the Clause as a check on 
religious divisiveness, strongly suggest a structural rather than an individually-oriented character to the 
Clause.  See, e.g., Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 717–728 (2002) (Breyer, J., joined by Souter 
and Stevens, JJ., dissenting); Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 698-705 (2005) (Breyer, J., concurring in 
the judgment).  For a critique of a divisiveness-based theory of adjudication under the Clause, see Richard 
Garnett, Religion, Division, and the First Amendment, 94 GEO. L.J. 1667 (2006). For a scholarly 
elaboration of a structural theory of the Establishment Clause, see Carl H. Esbeck, The Establishment 
Clause as a Structural Restraint on Governmental Power, 84 IOWA L. REV. 1 (1998).   Professor Esbeck 
explicitly references Flast as support for his structural theory.  Id. at 33–40.   
 88 McCreary County v. ACLU of Kentucky, 545 U.S. 844 (2005) (Ten Commandments display);  
Allegheny County v. ACLU, Greater Pittsburgh Chapter, 492 U.S. 573 (1989) (Creche display on County 
Courthouse steps). 
 89 The Establishment Clause is also exceptional in its particular relationship to concerns of 
federalism, a theme that has been emphasized by Justice Thomas, see Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709, 
727-28 (2005) (Thomas, J., concurring) (arguing that the Clause should not apply to the States because it 
was originally designed to keep the nation out of the business of controlling state policy on matters of 
religion), as well as a number of commentators.  See, e.g., Stephen D. Smith, FOREORDAINED FAILURE: THE 
QUEST FOR A CONSTITUTIONAL PRINCIPLE OF RELIGIOUS FREEDOM (Oxford, 1995); Ira C. Lupu & Robert 
W. Tuttle, Federalism and Faith, 55 EMORY L.J. 19 (2006); Richard C. Schragger, The Role of the Local in 
the Doctrine and Discourse of Religious Liberty, 117 Harv. L. Rev. 1810 (2004).  The federalism debate 
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Establishment Clause cases are public, not private, and a theory of public “injury” is 
frequently necessary for adjudication under the Clause to go forward.90 
 Among the Justices in the majority in Hein are several who have been hostile to 
this broad and exceptional notion of Establishment Clause injury.  Justices Scalia and 
Thomas, in particular, have argued that the Clause prohibits only 1) religious coercion, 
narrowly construed, of individuals, and 2) sectarian discrimination.  These Justices 
accordingly dissented in Lee v. Weisman,91 where they argued that graduation prayer did 
not subject students to coercion, because no punishment attached to their refusal to join in 
the prayer.92  And they dissented as well in McCreary County v. ACLU of Kentucky,93 
where they contended that the government should be free to display the Ten 
Commandments, a text valued by Judaism, Christianity, and Islam;94 in their view, only a 
more narrowly sectarian display, such as a Cross, would run afoul of the Establishment 
Clause.95  And the plurality opinion in Mitchell v. Helms,96 joined by these same Justices 
                                                                                                                                                 
has no direct bearing on the standing question, although it might lead those who agree with Justice Thomas 
to be even less hospitable to state and local taxpayer standing than they are to federal taxpayer standing.  If 
the Clause still protects states from coercive federal legislative intrusion on matters from religion, states 
should have standing to complain of such interference.  See Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709 (2005) 
(permitting states to complain that RLUIPA’s prison provisions violate the Establishment Clause but 
upholding those provisions on the merits); cf. Massachusetts v. EPA, 127 S. Ct. 1438 (2007) (holding that 
states have standing to complain of EPA’s failure to consider regulation of greenhouse gas emissions). 
 
90 For a scholarly account of the varieties of public injury associated with broad doctrines of non-
Establishment, see Steven G. Gey, Reconciling the Supreme Court’s Four Establishment Clauses, 8 U. OF 
PA. J. CONST. L. 725 (2006).  
 91 505 U.S. 577 (1992). 
  
92  Id. at 636–639 (Scalia, J., joined by Thomas, J., dissenting).  For a comparable scholarly 
account, see Michael W. McConnell, Coercion: The Lost Element of Establishment, 27 WM. & MARY L. 
REV. 933 (1986). 
 93 545 U.S. 844 (2005) 
 94 Id. at 894. 
 95 Id. at 894 n. 4.  See also Allegheny County v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 655-678 (1989) (Kennedy, 
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as well as Justice Kennedy, rejected the notion that the First Amendment barred 
government from financially supporting religious activities as a means to achieve a 
secular purpose. 
 The harms of legal coercion and sectarian preference fit comfortably within a 
much more conventional model of injury under Article III.  An exclusive focus on such 
injuries, however, calls into question the independent significance of the Establishment 
Clause.  State coercion of religious experience would seem to be a prima facie violation 
of the Free Exercise Clause,97 and sectarian preference in the state’s distribution of 
benefits or burdens would be a prima facie violation of the Equal Protection Clause.98  A 
private rights approach to non-Establishment thus tends to make the Establishment 
Clause constitutionally superfluous.   
By contrast, the “injuries” associated with religious alienation,99 state financial 
support for explicitly religious activities,100 offense to taxpayer conscience, and absence 
of secular legislative purpose101 do not fit within that conventional model.  The Souter 
group, in their dissent in Hein, asserted that the Establishment Clause embodies precisely 
                                                                                                                                                 
J., joined by Scalia, J., dissenting from a ruling that display of a Christmas creche in the County courthouse 
violated the Establishment Clause).  Justice Alito has evinced similar sentiments during his tenure on the 
Third Circuit.  See ACLU of N.J. v. Schundler, 168 F.3d 92 (3d Cir. 1999). 
 
96 530 U.S. 793, 835–836 (2000). 
 
97 See Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 621–622 (1992) (Blackmun, J., concurring). 
 
98 Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228, 245–247 (1982). 
 99 Justice O’Connor’s “no endorsement” theory rests on an anti-alienation principle.  Allegheny 
County v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 625-26, 633 (1989) (O’Connor, J., concurring) (holding that government 
should not be free to express itself in ways that intentionally create religious “insiders” and “outsiders”). 
100 See Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793, 867 (2000) (O’Connor, J., joined by Breyer, J., 
concurring) (Establishment Clause forbids direct state support of explicitly religious activity); id. at 899 
(Souter, J., joined by Ginsburg and Stevens, JJ, dissenting) (Establishment Clause forbids direct state 
support of pervasively religious entities, such as parochial schools). 
 
101 See, e.g., Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578 (1987) (invalidating Louisiana’s law requiring 
balanced treatment for creation science on the ground that the law lacked a secular purpose). 
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these kinds of normative concerns.  Although they did not concede the anomalous quality 
of their position on what constitutes an injury for Article III purposes,102 Justices in this 
group have consistently advanced a broad view of the substance of the Clause. For 
example, the same four Justices dissented in Zelman v. Simmons-Harris,103 which upheld 
the Ohio voucher plan for the Cleveland schools, and all four (joined by Justice 
O’Connor) agreed that McCreary County acted with the constitutionally impermissible 
purpose of endorsing or promoting a particular faith when the County posted the Ten 
Commandments.104  The Justices in this group support an unusually broad and 
constitutionally unconventional concept of “injury” in Establishment Clause cases, as 
reflected in their solicitude for taxpayers in Zelman and McCreary County.  True to such 
positions, the Justices in their dissent in Hein urged the Court to maintain taxpayer 
standing as broadly as possible, a breadth that reflects their more expansive conception of 
the Clause.105  
 These rival accounts of Establishment Clause doctrine animate the Justices’ views 
                                                 
 102 Hein v. Freedom from Religion Found., Inc.,, 127 S. Ct. 2553, 2587 (2000) (comparing 
taxpayer injury to environmental injury and the injury associated with racial gerrymandering). 
 103 536 U.S. 639, at 686-717 (Souter, J., joined by Breyer, Ginsburg, and Stevens, JJ., dissenting). 
 104 McCreary County v. ACLU of Ky., 545 U.S. 844, 847 (2005) 
 
105  We would expect scholars who continue to urge “separationist” interpretations of the Clause 
similarly to support broad notions of standing in Establishment Clause cases.  See, e.g., Christopher L. 
Eisgruber & Lawrence G. Sager, RELIGIOUS FREEDOM AND THE CONSTITUTION (Harv. Univ. Press 2007); 
Steven G. Gey, Reconciling the Supreme Court’s Four Establishment Clauses, 8 U. OF PA. J. CONST. L. 725 
(2006); Carl H. Esbeck, The Establishment Clause as a Structural Restraint on Governmental Power, 84 
IOWA L. REV. 1 (1998); Frederick Mark Gedicks, A Two-Track Theory of the Establishment Clause, 43 
B.C. L. REV. 1071 (2002); Steven K. Green, Of (Un)equal Jurisprudential Pedigree: Rectifying the 
Imbalance between eutrality and Seperationism, 43 B.C. L. REV. 1111 (2002); Marci A. Hamilton, 
Power, the Establishment Clause, and Vouchers, 31 CONN. L. REV. 807 (1999); Douglas Laycock, 
"oncoercive" Support of Religion: Another False Claim About the Establishment Clause, 26 VAL. U. L. 
REV. 37 (1991); Ira C. Lupu & Robert Tuttle, The Distinctive Place of Religious Entities in Our 
Constitutional Order, 47 VILL. L. REV. 37 (2002). 
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on standing, but this underlying substantive disagreement is only implicit in the Hein 
opinions.  Because the opinions focus solely on the plaintiffs’ alleged injury, they fail to 
address the deeper substantive meaning of the Clause.  This failure opens up a real and 
potentially widening gap between justiciability and substance.  After Hein, the substance 
of Establishment Clause doctrine remains tied to requirements that the government act 
only for secular purposes, ensure that its funds not be diverted to religious use, and avoid 
religious endorsement or divisiveness—concerns that are public and structural rather than 
private.  But the rule on justiciability of Establishment Clause challenges now depends on 
a showing of private injury, such as coercion or discriminatory treatment. 
 Gaps between substance and justiciability arise in other areas of constitutional 
law, but the opening that Hein creates in Establishment Clause law presents special 
difficulties.  In other areas, courts have articulated reasoned justifications for the limits on 
justiciability, such as the concerns about finality or institutional competence that underlie 
the “political question” doctrine.106  The limits recognized in Hein, however, lack any 
clear relationship to current substantive doctrine of the Establishment Clause.  The 
decision thus sets up an unexplained conflict between rival theories of the Establishment 
Clause—one that controls justiciability, and another that still controls the substance of the 
Clause. 
 This conflict generates the potential for instability and uncertainty in lower court 
decisions.  Some courts might follow the normative vision implicit in the Hein opinions 
by Justices Alito and Scalia and refuse to recognize other exceptional types of 
Establishment Clause injury, such as that of observers who view religious displays or 
                                                 
106  Nixon v. United States, 506 U.S. 224 (1993); see generally, Martin H. Redish, Judicial Review 
and the "Political Question," 79 NW. U. L. REV. 1031 (1985); Louis Michael Seidman, The Secret Life of 
the Political Question Doctrine, 37 J. Marshall L. Rev. 441 (2004).  
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experience legislative prayers. 
 Judge DeMoss’s concurring opinion in Doe v. Tangipahoa Parish School 
Board,107 referenced above, represents an early and important post-Hein move toward 
narrowing the universe of judicially cognizable injury under the Establishment Clause.  
As we discuss in more detail in Part VII below, Judge DeMoss’ opinion explicitly called 
attention to the discontinuity between general Article III standards and the justiciability 
rules that courts have been applying in Establishment Clause cases.  Relying explicitly on 
Hein, he pleaded for a return to conventional Article III considerations in Establishment 
Clause cases.108 If other judges in the lower federal courts follow the analytic lead of 
Judge DeMoss, the structure of Establishment Clause standing doctrine may ultimately 
collapse.  Eventually, the substance of the Clause may be understood as no broader than 
the norms of justiciability under the Clause; violations of the Clause, unless accompanied 
by legal coercion or explicit sect preference, will go unremedied.  Under those 
conditions, the Clause’s normative lessons are far less likely than at present to be 
internalized by government officials. 
V. HEI UNFOLDING – A CLOSER LOOK AT TAXPAYER STANDING CASES. 
 Armed with the interpretive conventions analyzed in Part III, and cognizant of the 
normative debate over competing views of the Establishment Clause, we are now in a 
position to analyze closely the ways in which the lower courts will interpret and apply 
Hein v. FFRF in cases involving taxpayer standing.  The key variables are likely to be 1) 
the type and degree of legislative specificity that funds will go to religious causes or 
                                                 
 107 494 F.3d 494 (5th Cir. 2007).  
 108 See id. at 500 and n. 2 (DeMoss, J., concurring). 
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entities; and 2) whether the plaintiff-taxpayers are federal taxpayers, challenging the use 
of federal funds, or state or local taxpayers, challenging the use of those kinds of tax 
funds to support religion. 
 The best analytic vehicles for understanding what may now develop in the lower 
courts are examples, real and hypothetical, of post-Hein taxpayer suits against publicly 
financed support for faith-based social service. 
 A. Easy cases.  It is not difficult to imagine easy cases in either direction.  An easy 
case for denying taxpayer standing would be one that resembles Hein in significant 
respects—that is, one with little legislative involvement in the decision to spend in ways 
that include religious entities.  For example, assume Congress creates a general budget 
for the buildings and grounds controlled by the Department of Labor.  The department’s 
budget request has asked for the money for general renovations and upkeep of existing 
buildings.  Now suppose that the Department decides to convert a meeting room in its 
headquarters into a chapel where employees can go to pray and meditate.109  Whether or 
not such a project violates the Establishment Clause, taxpayers will not be able to sue to 
block it.   In the absence of an explicit agency request for money to create a chapel, or a 
formal earmark by Congress of funds that must be used to create a chapel,110 
congressional budget authority for buildings and grounds cannot be seen as reflecting a 
                                                 
 109 Justice Souter’s dissent in Hein relied on a comparable example, without the details of 
legislative involvement: 
“It would surely violate the Establishment Clause for the Department of Health and Human Services to 
draw on a general appropriation to build a chapel for weekly church services (no less than if a statute 
required it), and for good reason: if the Executive could accomplish through the exercise of discretion 
exactly what Congress cannot do through legislation, Establishment Clause protection would melt away.”  
127 S. Ct. at 2586 (footnote omitted). 
 110  Justice Alito’s opinion in Hein asserted that informal earmarks of funds for particular 
purposes, noted in congressional committee reports, do not satisfy the requirement of legislative specificity, 
because the executive branch is not bound by them.  127 S. Ct. at 2568 n. 7. 
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legislative decision to spend for religious purposes.   Rather, such legislative 
appropriation is properly viewed against a backdrop of what is usual and customary in 
such matters, and an agency expenditure to build a place of worship is likely to be quite 
the opposite of “usual and customary.”   
 There are equally easy cases for recognition of taxpayer standing after Hein.  One 
would be a legislative grant formally earmarked to go to a religious group, such as the 
grant for sexual abstinence programs to the Silver Ring Thing.111  That grant was 
challenged in ACLU of Massachusetts v. Leavitt,112 a case which produced a settlement 
highly favorable to the plaintiffs, and nothing in Hein would preclude taxpayer-plaintiffs 
from litigating a similar case in the future.  Another clear-cut case would be a challenge 
to a federal agency grant, made to a faith-based organization, pursuant to the Charitable 
Choice provisions of the 1996 welfare reform enactment.113  Those provisions make 
explicit reference to the inclusion of faith-based providers as service grantees.  Congress 
knew and specifically intended that such providers be among the recipients of grants.  
Courts would deem any congressional appropriations, designated for use in making such 
                                                 
 111 See, e.g., FYI 2003 Omnibus Appropriations Bill, Pub. L. No. 108-7, 117 Stat. 11 (Feb. 20, 
2003),.  Several other such earmarks for the Silver Ring Thing are itemized in paragraph 66 of the 
complaint in ACLU of Massachusetts v. Leavitt, available at  
http://www.aclu.org/FilesPDFs/teeneducomplaint.pdf.  Similar earmarks at the state level have recently 
been held unconstitutional in ACLU Foundation of Louisiana v. Blanco, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 74718 
(invalidating specific legislative grants to named churches in recently enacted appropriations laws in 
Louisiana).  For further commentary on the Blanco case, see Ira C. Lupu and Robert W. Tuttle, Legal 
Update on ACLU Foundation of Louisiana v. Blanco, available at 
http://www.religionandsocialpolicy.org/legal/legal_update_display.cfm?id=63. 
 112 The case settled in February 2006.  For discussion of the importance of the settlement 
agreement, see Ira C. Lupu & Robert W. Tuttle, Legal Update on ACLU of Massachusetts v. Leavitt, 
available at http://www.religionandsocialpolicy.org/legal/legal_update_display.cfm?id=44. 
 113 Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-
193, 110 Stat. 2105 (codified as amended in various sections of 42 U.S.C., including 42 U.S.C. § 604a et 
seq. (1996)). 
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grants thereafter (by federal or state agencies), to have been made with both knowledge 
and expectation by Congress that some funds would go to religious groups for work 
training of welfare recipients, or some other purpose related to the welfare system.  
Accordingly, taxpayers would be free to challenge them under Flast, as construed by the 
Hein plurality.  Indeed, this example is precisely like Bowen v. Kendrick,114 a 1988 
decision which upheld taxpayer standing to challenge federal agency grants under an 
enactment that expressly referenced religious organizations as grantees.  The Alito 
opinion mentioned Bowen115 and said nothing to cast doubt on its continued validity. 
 B. Hard cases.  The difficult cases after Hein will involve legislation that falls 
somewhere near the mid-point of the continuum that runs between the easy cases; that is, 
enactments that do not clearly reveal legislative knowledge or intent that funds go to 
religious groups or causes, but which nevertheless give rise to a reasonable prediction or 
likelihood that funds will go in that direction.  An overlapping set of hard cases will 
involve state and local taxpayer standing to raise Establishment Clause claims, a subject 
which the Supreme Court has not had occasion to directly address since well before its 
decision in Flast. 
 Imagine, for example, that in the mid-1970s, a state legislature created a program 
designed to combat adult illiteracy.  Ever since, the legislature has funded the program by 
annual appropriations. The program is administered through the state Department of 
                                                 
 114 See 487 U.S. 589 (1988). 
 115 127 S. Ct. at 2567 (noting that the statute at issue in Bowen “expressly contemplated that 
[grants] might go to projects involving religious groups”)  It was unnecessary in Flast and Bowen to show 
that Congress intended the grants to go to religious activities, as distinguished from entities with a religious 
character.  Hein cannot fairly be read to require that sort of exacting specificity of congressional direction 
of funds to religious activities, which the Establishment Clause forbids government to do.  See further 
discussion of this distinction, infra, text at note 107 (discussing Mitchell v. Helms).  
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Education, which gives grants to local literacy initiatives.116  The program receives no 
federal money.  The Department in the past has given grants only to secular non-profits, 
but in 2007, the Department awards a grant to a church-based group that brings students 
into the church’s sanctuary for reading instruction and uses the Bible as its primary text.  
Do state taxpayers have standing to challenge this grant as a violation of the 
Establishment Clause? 
 This is a case in which the original enacting legislature in the 1970s may have had 
no knowledge or expectation that church groups would ever be grantees.  Among other 
relevant considerations, the prevailing constitutional law at that time precluded such a 
grant because the Supreme Court had interpreted the Establishment Clause to bar 
“pervasively sectarian” entities from direct receipt of government funds.117  In addition, 
the state Department of Education would probably have been aware of those 
constitutional rules because they appeared primarily in cases about aid to education.  
Accordingly, the state’s prior administrative practice of not even entertaining applications 
for grants from church groups may have been a product (at least in part) of those 
constitutional rulings. 
 But times have changed.  The Supreme Court has backed away from the bar on 
grants to pervasively sectarian entities118 and has limited the Establishment Clause to a 
                                                 
 116 The teachers in such an initiative are likely to be unpaid volunteers, but the Department gives 
grants to local non-profit groups that coordinate relationships between volunteer teachers and those adults 
who need their help. 
 117 See, e.g., Hunt v. McNair, 413 U.S. 734, 742-43 (1973). 
 118 In Mitchell v. Helms, a four-Justice plurality explicitly repudiated the concept that “pervasively 
sectarian” entities were barred from public aid, and the concurring opinion of Justices O’Connor and 
Breyer implicitly accepted that repudiation.  530 U.S. 793, 826–29, 860–67 (2000).  A number of lower 
courts have picked up on the significance of this development.See, e.g., Freedom from Religion Found., 
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ban on public funding of activities with religious content.  Moreover, President Bush has 
initiated the FBCI, and many states (perhaps even the imaginary one in which the 
example is unfolding) have created their own offices of faith-based and community 
initiatives119 designed to implement the President’s program.  As a result of these 
developments, our imaginary Department of Education (and other state departments as 
well) has begun to make grants to faith-based service providers. 
 Under these circumstances, courts might well attribute to the state legislature 
knowledge of, and responsibility for, grants by the state’s executive branch to faith-based 
organizations for adult literacy programs.  The competing arguments are obvious.  
Government lawyers, opposing taxpayer standing in the case, would argue that the 
enactment in the mid-1970s contemplated no such grants, that past practice reveals no 
pattern of such grants, and that one such grant in 2007 can be attributed only to a new 
administrative policy to widen the grantee base.  The plaintiff’s lawyers would have to 
focus on the relevant changes in constitutional law120 as well as changes in the national 
and state climate with respect to the role of faith groups in social services.  These lawyers 
would also assert that the state legislature is (or should be deemed to be) aware of this 
evolution of law and policy. On this view, the annual legislative appropriations for the 
program would be sufficient to constitute legislative recognition of the possibility that 
faith-based groups might receive a grant to run a literacy program, and that recognition 
would be sufficient to confer standing on state taxpayers.  After Hein, these competing 
                                                                                                                                                 
Inc. v. McCallum, 179 F.Supp. 2d 950, 969 (W.D. Wis. 2002); Am. Atheists, Inc. v. City of Detroit, 503 
F.Supp.2d 845, 862 (E.D. Mich., 2007). 
 119 See Mark Ragan & David Wright, The Policy Environment for Faith-Based Social Services in 
the United States: What Has Changed Since 2002?, THE ROUNDTABLE ON RELIGION AND SOC. WELFARE 
POL’Y, Dec. 2005, http://www.religionandsocialpolicy.org/homepage/State_Scan_2005_report.pdf.  
 
120 Such changes, of course, would only hurt the plaintiff’s case on the merits. 
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arguments seem to us a toss-up, with the victory likely turning on the judge’s views of 
the Establishment Clause and stare decisis. 
 An intriguing example of the contending views that we expect to appear in “hard 
cases” is presented by the pending appeal in Freedom from Religion Foundation, Inc. v. 
icholson,121 a case in which FFRF challenges, on behalf of federal taxpayers, the use of 
chaplains in the health care system operated by the U.S. Veterans’ Administration.  The 
government defendants did not raise the issue of the plaintiffs’ standing in the district 
court,122 which rejected the plaintiffs’ claim on its merits prior to the Supreme Court’s 
decision in Hein.123  On FFRF’s appeal to the 7th Circuit in icholson, the United States 
has now asserted that taxpayers lack standing to advance this Establishment Clause 
claim.124 
 The competing arguments for FFRF and the United States come as no surprise.  
The brief for FFRF emphasizes that Congress has required the Veterans’ Health 
Administration to provide medical services for veterans, and has appropriated money 
annually for the payment of such services.125  Because various practices of the VA 
chaplaincy, challenged in this case, fall within  the health services offered by the VA, 
                                                 
121 469 F. Supp. 2d 609 (WD Wisc. 2007). 
 
122  Id. at 616-617 (listing government’s arguments). 
 
123  Id. at 617-23. 
 
124 Brief for Defendant-Appellees in Freedom from Religion Foundation, Inc. v. icholson,  U.S. 
Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, No. 07-1292, available at 
http://www.ca7.uscourts.gov/efn/efns.fwx?caseno=07-1292&submit=showdkt&yr=07&num=1292.  The 
government’s arguments against taxpayer standing are found at pp. 22-36 of its brief. Because the question 
of plaintiffs’ standing is related to the court’s jurisdiction over the case, the government may raise the 
question at any time during the pendency of the litigation.  See, e.g., Kochert v. Greater Lafayette Health 
Services, Inc., 463 F.3d 710 (7th Cir. 2006), cert. denied, 127 S. Ct. 1328 (2007). 
 
125 Brief of Appellants in Freedom from Religion Foundation, Inc. v. icholson,  U.S. Court of 
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, No. 07-1292, at 18-24.  The brief is available at 
http://www.ca7.uscourts.gov/efn/efns.fwx?caseno=07-1292&submit=showdkt&yr=07&num=1292. 
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FFRF contends, these practices fall within what remains of the Flast exception – that is, 
taxpayers may challenge such specific appropriations, which are being used to promote 
religious experience.126 
 In response, government argues that the plurality opinion in Hein requires 
taxpayer-plaintiffs to show that Congress appropriated funds specifically for the 
challenged activity.127  Here, the appropriation supports medical services for veterans, 
both in VA hospitals and as outpatients, but Congress has not specified the use of a 
chaplaincy as part of those services.  Rather, the decision to rely on a chaplaincy corps is 
a decision made by the VA, an executive agency, not by the Congress.  Therefore, the 
government asserts, the practices challenged in the lawsuit are the result of executive 
branch decisions, rather than expressly mandated legislative expenditures in support of 
religious activity.128  Accordingly, the government’s brief concludes, these practices fall 
within the general policy against recognizing taxpayer standing, reinforced in Hein.129 
 icholson may be different from our hypothetical “hard case” of a grant to a 
church-based literacy program, because the icholson litigation involves a longstanding 
program of government-provided health care, in a context in which the presence of 
                                                 
126 Id. 
 
127 Brief for Defendant-Appellees, note __ supra, at 27. 
 
128 Id. at 27-32.  In addition, the government argues that the 7th Circuit’s decision in Winkler v. 
Gates, 481 F.3d 977 (7th Cir. 2007) also precludes taxpayer standing in FFRF v. icholson, because, as in 
Winkler, Congress has acted under the Military Clauses as well as under its power to tax and spend.  Brief 
for Defendant-Appellees, note __ supra, at 32-36.  In response, FFRF has asserted that Winkler – which 
involved congressionally authorized assistance by the Department of Defense to the Boy Scouts Jamboree 
– is distinguishable from the VA chaplains case because aid to the Scouts is primarily a disposition of 
surplus property and only secondarily a “spending” program.   Brief for Appellants, note __ supra, at 24-30. 
 
129 Brief for Defendant-Appellees, note __ supra, at 31-32. 
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chaplains is completely expected.  The military itself has such a chaplaincy corps,130 and 
it is commonplace for virtually all hospitals – VA or otherwise – to make use of chaplains 
in the care of patients.131  Accordingly, the presumption seems very strong that Congress 
is fully aware that it is spending for the VA health care chaplaincy, even if Congress is 
unaware of all of the details of how the VA implements the chaplaincy.  Nevertheless, the 
Seventh Circuit has already manifested a response to Hein that demonstrates an 
aggressive willingness to restrict the scope of taxpayer standing in Establishment Clause 
cases.132  Accordingly, icholson may well turn out to be a case that reveals the 
significant gap between a narrow and broad interpretation of what remains of Flast v. 
Cohen. 
   C.  Are State and Local Taxpayers Different from Federal 
Taxpayers?   
 Whatever the proper resolution of these issues of legislative awareness and 
specificity, the imaginary case of a grant to a church-based literacy program, discussed in 
the preceding section, is made still more difficult by the fact that it involves only state 
taxpayers.  Should the rule in Flast, as revisited in Hein, apply with equal force and on 
the same terms in this situation? 
                                                 
130 The Second Circuit has upheld the institution of the military chaplaincy against constitutional 
attack.  Katcoff v. Marsh, 755 F.2d 223 (2nd Cir. 1985).  For a full discussion of the many issues raised by 
contemporary operation of the military chaplaincy, see Ira C. Lupu & Robert W. Tuttle, Instruments of 
Accommodation: The Military Chaplaincy and the Constitution, 110 W. Va. L. Rev 87 (forthcoming, 
2007), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=996050. 
 
131 See generally, Association for Clinical Pastoral Education, et al., The Professional Chaplaincy: 
Its Role and Importance in Healthcare (discussing hospital accreditation requirements for pastoral care of 
patients), available at 
http://www.healthcarechaplaincy.org/publications/publications/white_paper_05.22.01/01.html. 
 
132 Error! Main Document Only.Hinrichs v. Speaker of the House of Representatives of the 
Indiana General Assembly, 2007 U.S. App. LEXIS 25363 (Oct. 30, 2007) (dismissing taxpayer challenge, 
on Establishment Clause grounds, to sectarian invocations at the beginning of legislative sessions). 
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 The Supreme Court has on a number of occasions treated the problems of state 
taxpayer standing as conceptually indistinguishable from federal taxpayer standing.  As 
recently as 2006, in Daimler Chrysler Corp. v. Cuno,133 the Court held that state and 
municipal taxpayers lacked standing in federal court to complain about the alleged 
illegality of a tax break designed to lure new businesses into a community.  The 
discussion in Daimler Chrysler proceeded on the assumption that the general policy 
against recognizing federal taxpayer standing applied with equal force to state and local 
taxpayers.134  Moreover, the Court’s rejection of state and local taxpayer standing was 
based on reasons identical to those typically invoked in federal taxpayer cases—the 
interests of state and local taxpayers are too general and remote to satisfy the concept of 
“injury.”135  In addition, the Daimler Chrysler opinion explicitly distinguished Flast as 
resting on special, taxpayer-focused concerns with respect to the Establishment Clause.136  
There was no hint in Daimler Chrysler that state or municipal taxpayers might be viewed 
differently from federal taxpayers for purposes of Establishment Clause standing. 
 Similarly, the Alito plurality  in Hein cites with approval the Court’s 1952 
                                                 
 133 126 S. Ct. 1854 (2006). 
 134 Id. at 1862–66.  Daimler Chrysler involved only the question of state and local taxpayers’ 
standing to sue in federal court, not their standing to bring suit in state court. 
 135 Id. at 1862. 
 136 For a unanimous Court in Cuno, Chief Justice Roberts wrote: 
Flast is consistent with the principle, underlying the Article III prohibition on taxpayer suits, that a 
litigant may not assume a particular disposition of government funds in establishing standing. The 
Flast Court discerned in the history of the Establishment Clause  
“the specific evils feared by [its drafters] that the taxing and spending power would be used to 
favor one religion over another or to support religion in general.” The Court therefore understood 
the “injury” alleged in Establishment Clause challenges to federal spending to be the very 
“extract[ion] and spen[ding]” of “tax money” in aid of religion alleged by a plaintiff. And an 
injunction against the spending would of course redress that injury, regardless of whether 
lawmakers would dispose of the savings in a way that would benefit the taxpayer-plaintiffs 
personally. 
Id. at 1865 (quoting Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 103, 106) (citation omitted). 
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decision in Doremus v. Board of Education of Hawthorne,137 which rejected state 
taxpayer standing for parents who objected on Establishment Clause grounds to a state 
law authorizing public school teachers to conduct Bible readings in class.  The Court in 
Doremus characterized the complaint as being about an objection to the reading, not an 
objection to the money spent on the salary for the teacher, and concluded that the 
plaintiff’s interest was unrelated to his taxpayer status.138 
 The Court has thus consistently treated federal, state, and local taxpayers as 
indistinguishable for purposes of taxpayer standing in federal court.  But this tale contains 
an anomaly, on which the Court has not yet focused.  Flast v. Cohen rests explicitly on 
the “nexus” between taxpayer status and the power of Congress in Article I, section 8, 
clause 1, to tax and spend.139  Hein (like Valley Forge before it) rejects taxpayer standing 
when that nexus is not present—that is, when the decision to benefit religion is an 
executive rather than legislative decision.140  In other words, Hein appears to recognize 
taxpayer standing only when the decisions to impose a tax and to spend on religion are 
made by a “unitary actor.”  Where the taxing and spending decisions are separated, as 
was the case with respect to the FBCI’s conferences, taxpayer standing does not exist.  
How does the requirement of a unitary actor, and the attendant concern for the “nexus” 
between taxpayer status and the claim of unlawful expenditure, map on to the actions of 
state and local government? 
                                                 
 137 342 U.S. 429 (1952), cited in Hein v. Freedom From Religion Found., Inc.  127 S. Ct. 
2553,2563 (2007). 
 
138 Id. at 432-35. 
 139 392 U.S. at 102–04. 
 
140 Hein, 127 S. Ct. at 2568. 
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 The dilemma that this question poses for courts is a function of the independence 
of state and local law from the federal model of separation of powers.  States are not 
obliged by the federal constitution to separate legislative and executive power in a way 
that matches the division between Congress and the President, although all of them do 
separate power in roughly that manner.141  Legislatures decide whether to tax, and either 
explicitly direct the spending, or delegate the power to spend to executive officials.   
 Local governments, however, may well not separate power in that conventional 
manner.142  They may combine taxing power and executive power in one body, such as a 
County Council that maintains executive authority over some county functions.143  Such a 
combination of powers would not present a problem under Hein, because that sort of 
combination would readily satisfy the theory of “unitary actor” that seems to underlie the 
Hein plurality.  In contrast, a complete separation of taxing and spending power would 
present a severe dilemma under such a theory.   Some types of local government may 
lack taxing authority of their own and get much of their revenue from state or county 
taxation, with a corresponding disconnection between the taxing authority and the body 
that decides how to spend the monies raised.144  Must state and local taxpayers show, 
                                                 
 141 Jim Rossi, Institutional Design and the Lingering Legacy of Antifederalist Separation of 
Powers Ideals in the States, 52 VAND. L. REV. 1167, 1190–91 (1999). 
 142 See generally, Richard Briffault, Who Rules at Home?: One Person/One Vote and Local 
Governments, 60 U. CHI. L. REV. 339 (1993) (detailing the varied structures and functions of local 
governments, and suggesting why concepts central to federal constitutional law may not apply in the local 
government context).  See also Inna Reznik, Note, The Distinction Between  
Legislative and Adjudicative Decisions in Dolan v. City of Tigard, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 242, 257–66 (2000) 
(varied roles of local land use authorities). 
 143 See Pelphrey v. Cobb County, 495 F. Supp. 2d 1311, 1318, n.3 (N.D. Ga. 2007) (distinguishing 
Hein in a case involving expenditures by the County Planning Commission, a  legislative body that 
sponsored a prayer before each Commission meeting); see also Briffault, supra note 115, at 348. 
 144  In most states, the taxing authority of local government is derived by delegation from the state 
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after Hein, that the governing body that decided to fund religious organizations is the 
same body that imposed the tax that raised the funds so spent? 
 A recently decided case, American Atheists, Inc., v. City of Detroit Downtown 
Development Authority,145 provides a good example of how this dilemma may present 
itself.  The Detroit City Council enacted a “Facade Improvement Project” (FIP) to 
enhance the city’s streetscape in advance of several nationally prominent events, 
including the 2006 NFL SuperBowl.146  The Council authorized the Downtown 
Development Authority (DDA), a “public body corporate” under Michigan law, to 
reimburse property owners for repairs to the exterior of buildings within a defined area of 
the city.147  Funds for the FIP were “derived from taxes levied by the City of Detroit and 
other units of government.”148  The FIP did not explicitly permit DDA to fund the 
improvement of houses of worship, nor did the program specifically prohibit such 
funding.149   The DDA entered into contracts with several churches, and plaintiffs 
brought suit, alleging that reimbursement of the churches would violate the Establishment 
Clause.150  Plaintiffs alleged—and the court agreed—that they had standing because they 
or their members paid property taxes within the development zone.151 
                                                                                                                                                 
government, and that delegation may be general or limited.  See, e.g., N.Y. Const. art. 16, § 1; Sonmax, Inc. 
v. City of New York, 392 N.Y.S.2d 810, 811–12 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1977), aff’d, 372 N.E.2d 9 (N.Y. 1977). 
 145 503 F.Supp.2d 845 (E.D. Mich. 2007). 
 
146 Id. at 849–50. 
 147 Id. at 849–50. 
 148 Id. at 849. 
 149 Id. at 850–52. 
 150 Id. at 852–53. 
 151 Id. at 854. 
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 Because the American Atheists case was briefed and argued before the Supreme 
Court’s decision in Hein, the government defendants apparently did not object to the 
plaintiffs’ standing as property taxpayers.  Had they done so in light of Hein,152 however, 
the question of standing in American Atheists would have been substantial.  If taxpayer 
standing depends on the existence of a unitary actor— the same entity responsible for 
both the taxation and the decision to spend on religion—then the plaintiff’s right to 
challenge Detroit’s FIP rests on shaky ground.  Because the Council did not explicitly 
address the participation of churches in the program, the court would be obliged to 
examine the relationship between the DDA and the Detroit City Council.  The legal 
nexus between the two entities might make it possible to regard the DDA’s specific 
funding decisions as acts independent of the authority of the City Council, thus 
destroying the requisite unity of taxing and spending.  It might also be possible to regard 
the DDA’s decisions as having been delegated by, and thus under the authority of, the 
City Council, and therefore preserve the unity of taxing and spending.  The question of 
taxpayer standing, therefore, might well turn entirely on how Michigan law treats local 
development authorities and their freedom to spend, independent of the parameters 
dictated by the taxing authorities.   
 If the required unity of taxing and spending prescribed by Hein is imposed on 
state and local law, federal judges will have to wrestle with complex issues of state and 
local taxing and spending authority, all for the purpose of deciding when taxpayers can 
sue and when they cannot.  It is difficult to believe that the Supreme Court intended to 
                                                 
152 The district court announced the decision in American Atheists on August 8, 2007, suggesting 
that the defendants had time to request supplemental briefing in light of Hein.  But the opinion gives no 
indication that they did so.  If there is an appeal to the Sixth Circuit in American Atheist, we expect that the 
standing question will come up, either because the parties will raise it or the appellate panel will raise it sua 
sponte. 
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impose such a task on the lower federal courts, and even more difficult to believe that 
application of such a doctrine will lead to sensible results under either Article III or the 
Establishment Clause.  Nevertheless, the legislative-executive distinction that drives Hein 
may result in precisely this dilemma.  Neither the values of non-Establishment, nor the 
values of intelligent federal-state relations, seem well-served by such an enterprise. 
 Moreover, a recent and prominent decision from the Seventh Circuit suggests that 
even some situations that do involve a “unitary actor,” which both taxes and spends for 
religious causes, may be insufficient to support state taxpayer standing.  In Hinrichs v. 
Speaker of the House of Representatives of the Indiana General Assembly,153 the panel 
relied explicitly on Hein to dismiss a challenge by Indiana taxpayers to the practice of 
religious invocations before each session of the Indiana House of Representatives. A 
House Rule explicitly authorized the practice,154 which of late had involved a significant 
proportion of prayers in the name of Jesus.155  The costs associated with the practice 
included those generated by the mailing a letter to clergy invited to give the prayer; the 
taking of photographs with House members and invited clergy; the mailing of thank-you 
notes and photographs to invited clergy after they delivered the prayer; and the costs of 
webcasting the prayer as part of Internet broadcast of House sessions.156  The district 
court had enjoined the Speaker from administering a system that involved sectarian 
                                                 
153 2007 U.S. App. LEXIS 25363 (7th Cir., Oct. 30, 2007).  The lower court had enjoined the 
practice of sectarian prayer in these invocations, including specifically the use in the prayer of “Christ’s 
name or title or any other denominational appeal.” 
 
154 Id. at *4 (“House Rule 10.2 calls for a prayer or invocation to be given each meeting day before 
the House conducts any business.”) 
 
155 Id. at *6-*7. 
 
156 2007 U.S. App. LEXIS at *7-*8.  The court describes the costs as “minimal,” which they 
appear to be. 
  
44 
prayer.157 
 The 7th Circuit, in a 2-1 panel decision authored by Judge Ripple,158 ruled that the 
Indiana legislature had not specifically authorized the use of state funds for these 
purposes, and that accordingly state taxpayers lacked standing to challenge them.  That 
the challenged Rule, practices, and expenditures were entirely a product of the state 
House of Representatives, and that the state’s executive branch had nothing to do with 
them, appeared to give the panel no reason for hesitation.  As Judge Ripple interpreted 
Hein, taxpayers could not maintain the suit because  the Indiana Legislature had done no 
more than authorize general  administrative expenditures by the House, and had not 
explicitly mandated the expenditures for prayer.159  
 Judge Wood – who had recently shown herself as something other than a 
universal champion of taxpayer standing in Establishment Clause cases160 – dissented in 
                                                 
 
157 Hinrichs v. Bosma, 400 F. Supp. 2d 1103 (SD Ind 2005).  The injunction extended  specifically 
to the use in the prayer of “Christ’s name or title or any other denominational appeal.” 2007 U.S. App. 
LEXIS at *9, n.3. 
 
158 As discussed in Part I, supra, Judge Ripple had dissented from the panel decision in Hein, and 
had dissented as well from the Seventh Circuit’s denial of the government’s petition to rehear the case en 
banc.  Judge Ripple’s opinions in Hein, it is fair to say, suggest that he is strongly predisposed to read Flast 
v. Cohen as narrowly as possible. 
 
159 2007 U.S. App. LEXIS at *41-*42.   Judge Ripple was quite explicit about the significance of 
Hein in “clarifying” the law of taxpayer standing since the Seventh Circuit’s earlier disposition of the 
Indiana Speaker’s motion for a stay in Hinrichs.  Id. at *44-*45.  Judge Ripple suggested that the federal 
courts might be more favorably inclined toward municipal taxpayer standing than state taxpayer standing, 
id. at *45, n.9.  Perhaps the law of some states favors local over state taxpayers for purposes of access to 
courts, but whatever policies of local government may justify that distinction do not map onto Article III or 
the Establishment Clause. The relevant population numbers alone cannot support such differential 
treatment.  Are those who pay taxes to Los Angeles or New York City in any way more injured by local 
expenditures than state taxpayers are injured by state expenditures in lightly populated states like Idaho or 
Rhode Island? 
 
160 Winkler v. Gates, 481 F.3d 977 (7th Cir. 2007) (Wood, J.) (taxpayers lack standing to complain 
of Establishment Clause violation in implementation of Boy Scout Jamboree Act, because the challenged 
aid to the Scouts by the U.S. Department of Defense is primarily a disposition of surplus property in 
possession of the Executive Branch, and only secondarily a program of taxing and spending). 
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Hinrichs.161  She  argued explicitly that the Establishment Clause “uniquely involves . . . 
.psychic, aesthetic, or intangible injury,”162 rather than physical or monetary harm.  
Moreover, she emphasized the conceptual chasm between Hein and Hinrichs.  The 
former had involved congressional appropriations for the White House budget, 
apparently made with no foresight to the possibility of expenditure to promote religion-
based social services, and the exercise of executive discretion.  In contrast, the 
invocations before House sessions in Indiana without question involved unitary,   intra-
branch action, because the invocations did not involve the state’s executive branch at 
all.163 
 In earlier sections of this article, we suggested that lower court judges would react 
to Hein, at least in part, on the basis of their pre-existing jurisprudential views of the 
Establishment Clause and their corresponding inclinations to interpret Hein in light of 
those views.  The opinions of Judge Ripple and Judge Wood in Hinrichs are Exhibit A in 
support of that suggestion.  And there is no question that Judge Ripple’s view has, for the 
moment, removed the courts from a highly controversial dispute about the sectarian 
character of legislative invocations.  Whether other potential plaintiffs, such as those who 
may observe the House’s invocations from the legislative balcony,164 may yet appear and 
                                                 
 
161 2007 U.S. App. LEXIS at *48-*82. 
 
162 Id. at 64. 
 
163 Id. at *70-*76. 
 
164 In his original complaint, Mr. Hinrichs had alleged injury as both a taxpayer and as an 
individual subject to unwanted exposure to the invocations, because he had been a lobbyist who at times 
attended these sessions.  Id. at *16, n.5.  But Hinrichs ended his job as a lobbyist during the litigation, and 
abandoned this alternative theory of injury.  Id. 
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mount a new challenge, remains to be seen.165 
VI. THE INCENTIVE EFFECTS OF HEI AND THE PROBLEMS OF THE 
LEGISLATIVE-EXECUTIVE DISTINCTION 
 Much of this paper’s focus is on the likely judicial responses to Hein.  The 
executive-legislative distinction that now controls the law, however, suggests the 
possibility of perverse incentives for both legislative and executive branches, at all levels 
of government, that are considering funding faith-based programs.166   Prior to Hein, 
Congress and President George W. Bush had been deadlocked over the question of 
legislative authorization for the Faith-Based and Community Initiative.  The President 
had sought such authorization for all federally financed social services, but the proposed 
bills had stalled in Congress,167 and the President (in late 2002) eventually issued an 
Executive Order to expand the Initiative to all federally funded social services.168 
         Ironically, the Executive Branch’s failure to get broad legislative buy-in to the 
FBCI may have led to an executive victory in Hein.  Because Congress had not 
specifically authorized the creation of the WHOFBCI, the Alito plurality was unwilling 
to lay the conference expenditures at the legislature’s doorstep.  In the future, this lesson 
of Hein will not be lost on savvy lawyers in both the legislative and executive branches.  
                                                 
165 In Part VII, below, we consider the Article III questions presented by non-taxpayer plaintiffs, 
such as those who observe (rather than pay for) state promotion of religion. 
 166 We are especially grateful to David Wright, of the Nelson A. Rockefeller Institute on State and 
Local Government, State University of New York, for focusing our attention on this point.  
 167 The most prominent measure was the proposed Community Solutions Act of 2001, H.R. 7, 
107thCong. (2001).  The primary political obstacle to enactment was the inclusion of a provision protecting 
the right of grantees to engage in faith-based hiring.  For fuller discussion of the executive-legislative 
history of the Charitable Choice movement, see Ira C. Lupu & Robert W. Tuttle, The Faith-Based Initiative 
and the Constitution, 55 DEPAUL L. REV. 1, 5–14 (2005). 
 168 Equal Protection of the Laws for Faith-Based and Community Organizations, Exec.  Order No. 
13279, 3 C.F.R. 258 (2003). 
  
47 
To the extent that legislatures remain silent about or ignorant of expenditures for faith-
based organizations and activities, courts may reject taxpayer standing to challenge those 
activities.    
 This justiciability-driven incentive to legislative silence may in some 
circumstances compete with strong incentives to the contrary.  Legislatures may want 
political credit for these initiatives, and may also want to lock future executives into 
them.  Statutory approval of faith-based initiatives will do just that.  Likewise, from the 
perspective of the executive branch, legislative approval may signal wider and deeper 
political support for the program, greater likelihood of its continuity, and strong grounds 
for future executive calls for expanded funding.  When grants to religious organizations 
are especially controversial, as may have been the case in Detroit in the American 
Athesists lawsuit discussed above, joint legislative-executive ratification of such grants 
may help ensure their political legitimacy.169 
 These incentive-based considerations, together with the uncertainty concerning 
the sort of “hard cases” discussed in Part V.B. above, suggest that the six Justices who 
reject the legislative-executive distinction have a position far more persuasive than those 
who joined the plurality in Hein.170  The injury to taxpayers that results from government 
spending cannot be fairly traced to which branch is primarily responsible for the decision 
to spend.  So long as the substantive doctrine of the Establishment Clause extends to 
                                                 
169 Such joint support of course cannot dispose of questions that might be raised about such grants 
under the Establishment Clause. 
 170 For a different view, see Debra Lowman, A Call for Judicial Restraint: Federal Taxpayer 
Grievances Challenging Executive Action, 30 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 651 (2007).  Ms. Lowman’s piece 
focuses on the Seventh Circuit’s disposition in Hein.  She argues that Flast is anomalous, and should not be 
extended to executive branch decisions to spend for religion.  Although she is correct that Flast is 
exceptional, Ms. Lowman does explore the functional reasons for creating exceptional standing 
requirements in Establishment Clause cases.  In the absence of those reasons, taxpayer standing to 
complain about either branch may not be justifiable.  Id. at 655–67}. 
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actions by executive officers, as it has for many years,171 it makes neither conceptual nor 
functional sense to draw a line between the branches for purposes of justiciability only.     
Functionality has long been the key to understanding the various doctrines of 
Establishment Clause standing.  Many religion-promoting acts by government create no 
obvious material or personal injury and may be quite popular.  The political branches 
thus will frequently have incentives to violate the Clause.  Without broad notions of 
justiciability in Establishment Clause cases, there is reason to expect that the Clause 
would be significantly under-enforced.172  Just as prudential considerations may lead 
courts to deny standing in cases in which Article III minima are satisfied,173 a different 
set of prudential considerations may justify the extension of standing in cases where 
conventional Article III criteria appear unmet.  Constitutional prudence may therefore 
serve as a two-way ratchet, allowing some plaintiffs to remain in the courthouse even as 
it yanks some of them out.  These prudential considerations bear absolutely no 
relationship to the distinction between legislative and executive action, because either or 
both branches may reap political benefits from taking actions that violate the 
Establishment Clause.  Moreover, as explained above, drawing a line between challenges 
to executive and legislative acts may encourage legislatures to abdicate policy-making 
                                                 
 171 See, e.g., Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 672–87 (1984) (Mayor’s decision to erect 
Christmas display); Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 310–15 (1952) (public school system’s program of 
“released time” for religious instruction subject to Establishment Clause constraints).  These decisions 
involve local government, but no one has ever suggested that the Executive Branch of the U.S. is not 
similarly subject to the Clause.  
 172 Of course, even broad doctrines of justiciability will not lead to adjudication of the merits of 
every conceivable violation of the Clause.  See, e.g., Newdow v. Bush, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 25936, at 
*2–*3, *11 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 28, 2001) (“electronic” attendance at Presidential inauguration is insufficient 
for standing to challenge religious content of President’s Inaugural address). 
 
173 Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1, 19 (2004)  
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responsibility, and to confer unjustifiably broad discretion on the executive branch 
whenever religion-promoting activity may be associated with a particular government 
program.  
 It is difficult to imagine that the executive-legislative distinction on which Hein 
rests would have been persuasive as an original matter to any of the current Justices other 
than Kennedy.   His view rests on power separation concerns about judicial interference 
with the details of executive branch administration of law and policy.  These concerns 
may be well-founded, but could easily be taken into consideration at the merits stage of 
Establishment Clause litigation.  Courts are not going to find it necessary or appropriate 
to enjoin Presidents from referring to God or religious faith in official pronouncements.  
Similarly, courts will not parse executive branch speeches to measure the extent or 
quality of religious details.  But if a President decided to use funds from his general 
White House budget to erect a permanent Latin cross or other, highly sectarian religious 
symbol on the White House lawn, no sensible legal logic explains why taxpayers should 
be entitled to challenge that enterprise only if Congress had specifically authorized it.174 
  VII. SUITS BY NON-TAXPAYER PLAINTIFFS 
 The impact of Hein will turn in part on whether the decision’s restrictive attitude 
toward standing is limited to taxpayer plaintiffs, and whether other plaintiffs are available 
to challenge practices that taxpayers might have targeted.  This part explores those 
questions.  We begin with cases involving government financial support for religion.  We 
                                                 
 174 The plurality suggested that someone other than taxpayers might have standing to challenge 
blatant violations of the Establishment Clause by the Executive Branch.  Hein v. Freedom From Religion 
Found., Inc., 127 S. Ct. 2553, 2571 (2007).  As we discuss in Part VII below, however, other bases for 
standing in Establishment Clause cases may be quite as exceptional as taxpayer standing, and we doubt that 
the members of the plurality would leave that anomaly unnoticed. 
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then turn to consideration of cases in which government promotes religion by speech or 
symbol, rather than through financial means. 
          A. Funding Cases    
In some of the cases that challenge grants made under the FBCI, taxpayers are the 
only conceivable plaintiffs because typically no one is injured by a decision to fund a 
particular grantee.  In such cases, a lack of taxpayer standing may mean that no private 
citizens can sue to enforce the Establishment Clause against state funding agencies.  
Other government officials, such as a state Attorney General, might be able to take action 
to enforce the Clause on behalf of a general public interest in constitutional compliance, 
but action by state officials to enforce federal constitutional law is exceedingly rare.175 
 In some situations, potential plaintiffs other than taxpayers might be available.  
For example, a disappointed rival for a grant may complain that the grant was unlawfully 
awarded.  In cases where the rival is a religious organization, however, the only 
constitutional claim that will be raised is religious preferentialism, not the promotion of 
religion with government funds.  If, for example, a Muslim group sues to complain about 
unlawful preference for Christians or Jews, the Muslim group will neither seek nor desire 
an order excluding all religious groups from grant eligibility.  The injury to the Muslim 
group would be that of religious discrimination, rather than the inclusion of religious 
entities in the class of potential grantees.  Accordingly, claims of sect preference will 
never lead to the wholesale adjudication of the permissibility of including religious 
                                                 
 175 State attorneys general are far more likely to be involved in enforcement of state constitutional 
restrictions on financial assistance to religious entities.  See, e.g. Ga. Op. Atty. Gen. No. 00-5, 2000 WL 
777917 (2000) (Georgia Constitution prohibits state grants to religious schools for after-school “Reading 
Challenge” program);, 69 Op. Att’y Gen. 136 (Ga. 1969) (state funding of YMCA likely to violate state 
constitution); 18 Op. Att’y Gen. (Neb. 1995) (grants to private religious schools would violate the state 
constitution). 
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activities as a permissible object of funding.  
 Another example of an alternative plaintiff may arise in cases that involve 
allegations of religious coercion.  Some litigation about faith-based programs in prison 
has raised such claims,176 as does the recent lawsuit against North Dakota for funding a 
program that allegedly coerces teenagers into religious observance. 177  A teenager placed 
against her will in such a facility would unquestionably have standing to complain about 
such coercion.  But, akin to the example discussed above involving claims of sectarian 
preference, these teenager-plaintiffs would not have standing to complain about 
government funding of any voluntary religious experience at the Ranch, because 
uncoerced religious experience would not cause such a plaintiff any injury.   
 Thus, non-taxpayer plaintiffs may be available in some cases, but they will 
inevitably be limited in the kinds of claims they can present, and the remedies they will 
seek, to those which are connected to the particular injury they have suffered.  Only 
taxpayers will be free to argue that an ongoing program of expenditures, or a particular 
grant, must be enjoined because the program or grant impermissibly subsidizes religious 
experience. 
                                                 
 176  See, e.g., Ams. United v. Prison Fellowship Ministries, 395 F. Supp. 2d 805 (S.D. Iowa 2005); 
see also a discussion of the lawsuit in Moeller v. Bradford County, filed 2/17/05, in Ira C. Lupu & Robert 
W. Tuttle, Legal Update, THE ROUNDTABLE ON RELIGION AND SOC. WELFARE POL’Y, March 21, 2005, 
http://www.religionandsocialpolicy.org/legal/legal_update_display.cfm?id=35.  Moeller has now been 
settled with no admission of wrongdoing and a commitment by the County to refrain from funding any 
religious activity in its rehabilitation programs for prisoners.  See Lisa R. Howeler, Bradford County Settles 
Lawsuit with Bradford County Alliance for Democracy, SAYRE EVENING TIMES, April 6. 2007, 
http://www.religionandsocialpolicy.org/news/article.cfm?id=6302. 
 177 See Neela Banerjee, orth Dakota is Sued in Church-State Case, N.Y. TIMES, June 21, 2007, at 
A16; Claire Hughes, Lawsuit Targets Troubled Teens’ Placement in Christian Homes, THE ROUNDTABLE 
ON RELIGION AND SOC. WELFARE POL’Y, June 19, 2007,  
http://www.religionandsocialpolicy.org/news/article.cfm?id=6635.  For further analysis of the legal 
complaint in the North Dakota case, see Ira C. Lupu and Robert W. Tuttle, Legal Update on Freedom from 
Religion Foundation v. Bjergaard, available at 
http://www.religionandsocialpolicy.org/legal/legal_update_display.cfm?id=61. 
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 B.  on-funding Cases—Standing to Challenge Government Religious Speech 
 On the surface, nothing in Hein appears to threaten the current structure of 
standing to sue in cases involving government-sponsored religious speech.  Hein is a case 
about taxpayer standing, and lawyers have understood for years that Flast is a narrow and 
specific exception to the general bar on generalized taxpayer grievances in the federal 
courts. 
 But no crystal ball is required to perceive that the anti-exceptionalism that 
animates Hein may spill over into challenges to government religious speech.  In such 
cases, standing frequently rests on an elusive and highly contestable concept of injury.  
Except for disputes arising in public schools,178 standing in government display cases 
often rests entirely on “observer” status.179  In ACLU of Kentucky v. McCreary County, 
for example, the basis for standing was that the plaintiffs “must come into contact with 
the display of the Ten Commandments whenever they enter the courthouse to conduct 
business.”180  And in Van Orden v. Perry,181 the basis for Mr. Van Orden’s standing to 
challenge the Ten Commandments display on the Texas State Capitol grounds was his 
encounters with the monument during his frequent visits to the grounds, typically to use 
                                                 
 178  In Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1, 35-37 (2004), the Court dismissed on 
standing grounds Mr. Newdow’s complaint about the recitation of the Pledge of Allegiance in his 
daughter’s public school.  But the ground for the dismissal was a concern, labeled “prudential” by the 
Court, that Mr. Newdow lacked custodial parent status with respect to his daughter.  The Justices all 
assumed that Newdow would have had standing to assert his daughter’s rights to be free from government 
religious speech in school if he had full rights of custody.  Id. at 11–18. 
 
179 Taxpayer standing may sometimes be a basis for suit in cases involving government religious 
speech, but the Seventh Circuit’s recent decision in Hinrichs, analyzed in Part V.C. supra, has raised 
serious doubts about taxpayer standing in such cases. 
 180 ACLU v. McCreary, 96 F. Supp. 2d 679, 682 (E.D. Ky. 2000), aff’d as modified, McCreary 
County v. ACLU of Kentucky, 545 U.S. 844 (2005).  
 181 545 U.S. 677 (2005). 
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the law library in the State Supreme Court building nearby.182 
Though judges may have become completely accustomed to recognizing this sort 
of injury in religious display cases, visual or aural exposure to a government wrong—
even in a context like McCreary, where exposure is a condition of access to a public 
place or good—would not constitute an injury sufficient to satisfy Article III 
requirements under any other constitutional provision.  If someone visits a courthouse 
and observes patently unfair trials, or blatant acts of racial discrimination, or cruel and 
unusual punishments, the viewer would not have suffered an injury within the meaning of 
Article III.  Standing for observers in Establishment Clause cases is thus as exceptional as 
standing for taxpayers.  If the Establishment Clause context were to be removed, standing 
would likely disappear.183 
                                                 
 182 Id. at 682. 
 
183 The closest the Court has come in other contexts to recognizing observer standing is in 
environmental cases, in which persons who allege that they make physical use of public space are permitted 
to bring actions designed to protect the environmental integrity of that space.  See, e.g., Sierra Club v. 
Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 735 (1972) (dismissing action because of no allegation that Club’s members used 
the Mineral King Valley); Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Env’t. Serv. (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 
173–74 (2000) (upholding standing of people who live near and use a stream to bring action complaining of 
water pollution).   Environmental standing for those who make recreational or economic use of public 
space seems different from observer standing in Establishment Clause cases for two reasons.  First, 
environmental cases tend to be based on statutory rather than constitutional causes of action; when 
Congress has chosen to protect environmental interests, courts would be thwarting the legislative will if 
they refused to allow persons who suffer identifiable injury, tied to their use of the relevant place, from the 
effect of polluting activities.  In contrast, Establishment Clause cases typically do not come with the boost 
of statutory causes of action; these cases rest on the Constitution alone, where counter-majoritarian 
concerns are strongest and therefore animate prudential limits on standing.  Second, environmental 
plaintiffs typically allege that their actual physical use of the place will be diminished if the polluting 
activities continue.  See Daniel Farber, A Place-Based Theory of Standing (UC Berkeley Public Law 
Research, Paper No. 1013084, 2007), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1013084.  In contrast, users of public space that 
contains religious expression— for example, courthouses, parks, grounds of public buildings— do not 
allege that their ability to use and enjoy the space is physically diminished by the expressed religious 
sentiments.  Rather, the injury seems more psychological and less physical than in environmental cases.  
We hasten to add that we do not think that the justiciability of these cases should turn on distinctions this 
fine.  Rather, we believe that considerations of prudence and need for judicial enforcement underlie 
environmental standing cases in ways highly similar to Establishment Clause cases.  In both sets of cases, 
the legal system depends upon a concept of “private attorneys general” to police the action of the political 
  
54 
 As we noted in our introductory reference to the Fifth Circuit’s en banc decision 
in Doe v. Tangipahoa Parish School District,184 Hein has already begun to spill over in 
this direction.  Doe involved a challenge by a resident and taxpayer of Tangipahoa Parish, 
Louisiana, to a variety of prayer practices in or related to the public schools, which Doe’s 
two sons attended.185  Doe alleged in his complaint that his sons had been exposed to 
officially sponsored prayers in the schools.  He further alleged that he had attended Board 
meetings at which the Board sponsored pre-meeting prayers, some of which were 
explicitly in Jesus’s name.186  
 On the merits, the district court accepted the plaintiff’s argument that the Supreme 
Court’s decisions involving school-sponsored prayer,187 rather than its decision in Marsh 
v. Chambers188  permitting legislative prayer, were controlling, and enjoined all officially 
sponsored prayer at Board meetings.189  A Fifth Circuit panel modified the district court 
                                                                                                                                                 
branches. Many of the Justices who would limit or overturn Flast tend to be the same Justices who would 
limit environmental standing as well.  See Massachusetts v. EPA, 127 S. Ct. 1438, 1463–1478 (2007) 
(Roberts, CJ, joined by Alito, Scalia, and Thomas, JJ). 
 184 494 F.3d 494 (5th Cir. 2007).  Prior to this case, the Fifth Circuit had already exhibited signs of 
internal struggle over doctrines of standing in Establishment Clause cases.  See Doe v. Beaumont Indep. 
Sch. Dist., 240 F.3d 462, 464 (5th Cir. 2001) (en banc) (affirmance by equally divided court of parents’ 
standing to challenge program of “clergy in the schools”, which involved volunteers and no government 
financial support). 
 185Doe v. Tangipahoa Parish Sch. Bd., 473 F.3d 188, 191 (5th Cir. 2006).  The case originally 
involved pre-game prayers before athletic contests, student-led prayers over the PA system, and prayers 
recited before school board meetings.  The panel opinion reports that all of the issues other than prayer at 
Board meetings were resolved under a consent judgment.  . 
186  Id. at 192. 
 187 Santa Fe Ind. Sch. Dist v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290 (2000); Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577 (1992); 
Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38 (1985); Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39 (1980); Abington Sch. Dist. v. 
Schemmp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963); Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962). 
 188 463 U.S. 783 (1983). 
 189 Doe v. Tangipahoa Parish Sch. Bd., No. 03-2870, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3329, at *32 (E.D. 
La. Feb. 24, 2005). 
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order to cover only sectarian prayers.190  The Board did not contest Doe’s standing to sue, 
but the panel decision, sua sponte, raised the question of Doe’s standing, and concluded 
that the party’s stipulations of agreed facts permitted an implication of admission of the 
allegations that Doe had attended the relevant meetings.191  On this basis, the panel 
concluded that Doe’s standing to challenge the prayers at Board meetings had been 
adequately established by his uncontested allegation of physical presence at the meetings. 
 The Board successfully petitioned the Fifth Circuit for rehearing en banc.  
Precisely one month to the day after the Supreme Court’s decision in Hein, the full Fifth 
Circuit ruled (eight to seven) that Mr. Doe’s standing to complain about the prayers had 
not been successfully demonstrated.192   The majority opinion, by Judge Edith Jones, did 
not challenge the legal proposition that attendance at meetings where Board-sponsored 
prayers were uttered was sufficient to confer standing on Doe.  Rather, the majority 
opinion argued that the facts demonstrating injury to Mr. Doe (attendance, plus a sense of 
offense at hearing the prayers) had not been proven, and that the “implied admission” 
theory on which the Circuit panel had relied was insufficient to make up for that lack of 
proof. 193 
                                                 
 190 Doe, 473 F.3d at 204–06. 
 191 Id. at 194–96. 
 192 Doe, 494 F.3d at 498–99.  .  The en banc court vacated the district court’s judgment, and 
remanded the case with instructions to dismiss.  Id. at 499.  
 193 The panel opinion’s author, Judge Barksdale, wrote a strenuous dissent (joined by four others) 
to this disposition of the case, id. at 501, as did Judge Benavides.  Id. at 509 (joined by six others).  The 
narrow majority of the  Fifth Circuit was probably using this strained argument to avoid the merits of a 
politically and legally difficult case.  The courts in a number of jurisdictions have been struggling with the 
question of sectarian legislative prayer. Hinrichs v. Bosma, 410 F. Supp. 2d 745 (S.D. Ind. 2006); Coles v. 
Tracy, 171 F.3d 369 (6th Cir. 1999) (striking down school board prayer); Bacus v. Palo Verde Unified 
School District Board of Education, 52 Fed. Appx 355 (9th Cir. 2002) (same); Wynne v. Town of Great 
Falls, 376 F.3d 292 (4th Cir. 2004) (striking down practice of sectarian prayer); Simpson v. Chesterfield 
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 As noted in the Introduction to this paper, however, Judge DeMoss was not 
content with this narrow disposition.  Relying explicitly on Hein and its concern for 
separation of powers,194 he challenged the idea that voluntary attendance at a Board 
meeting would inflict on Mr. Doe or his children an “individualized and direct injury.”195  
In Judge DeMoss’s view, “this case is like Hein in that the Does have established only a 
general grievance indistinguishable from the one that any other non-attendee citizen 
could have.”196  In addition, he accused the Supreme Court of contradicting its own 
Article III jurisprudence: “On the one hand, the Court has stated that the standing 
requirements in Establishment Clause cases are as rigorous as in other types of cases. . . . 
On the other hand, the Court has implicitly, and wrongly in my view, assumed standing 
in Establishment Clause cases where plaintiffs have not alleged or proved an injury that 
would suffice to confer standing in any other type of case.”197 
 Whatever ensues with respect to the particular controversy in Doe v. Tangipahoa 
Parish School District, Judge DeMoss’ opinion has splashed blood into the water.  
Government lawyers, and other judges in this and other Circuits, are now likely to focus 
                                                                                                                                                 
County Board of Supervisors, 404 F.3d 276 (4th Cir. 2005) (upholding practice of nonsectarian prayer, but 
permitting board to deny invitation to Wiccan practitioner because no general invitation is extended to the 
public).  Like the dismissal of Hinrichs in the Seventh Circuit, Hinrichs v. Speaker, 2007 U.S. App. LEXIS 
25363 (7th Cir., Oct. 30, 2007), a similar dismissal of Doe’s case permitted the Fifth Circuit to avoid that 
question for the moment.  Because the disposition turned on the adequacy of proof, rather than a legal 
proposition about standing in cases of this type, the court has every reason to expect that the issue will 
return. Indeed, Judge Jones concluded her opinion with an express recognition that the controversy would 
soon be back: “To find lack of standing at this late stage no doubt poses an inconvenience for the parties. 
On the other hand, it spares this court from issuing a largely hypothetically-based ruling on issues of broad 
importance to deliberative public bodies in this circuit and beyond.  Finally, given the ideological nature of 
the case, it is not hard to conceive that a more concrete controversy may arise in the future.”  Doe, 494 F.3d 
at 499. (footnote omitted).  
 194 Id. at 497–99. 
 195 Id. at 500. 
 196 Id.  
 197 Id.  
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on the argument that “observer standing” is as anomalous as taxpayer standing, and they 
may see Hein as the opening volley in the battle to remove such apparent anomalies from 
doctrines of justiciability. 
 We expect that some cases involving prayer in public schools will escape this 
trend.  The Supreme Court’s analyses of the effects of prayer at public school 
commencements in Lee v. Weisman,198 and pre-game prayer in Santa Fe Independent 
School District v. Doe,199 strongly suggest that the state may not make passive 
participation in worship a condition of access to the public goods delivered by a 
government-provided school system.  Attaching such a condition is a form of coercion, 
and thus falls within conventional notions of injury, at least in Justice Kennedy’s view.200  
Moreover, standing to challenge elective, Bible study courses in public schools may rest 
on a theory of de facto religious discrimination against students who wish to study the 
Bible as literature, but are effectively precluded from the course by its sectarian religious 
content.201   
 When, however, school-sponsored religious expression does not require any form 
of student participation or effectively exclude students from access to a scarce 
opportunity, parental or student standing to challenge such expression may be more 
                                                 
 198 505 U.S. 577, 598–99 (1992) (students exposed to school-sponsored prayer at commencement 
are unconstitutionally coerced into religious experience); see also Mellen v. Bunting, 327 F.3d 355, 360 
(4th Cir. 2003) (VMI cadets exposed to daily supper prayer are being unconstitutionally coerced). 
 
199 530 U.S. 290 (2000).  
 
200 Justice Kennedy is the author of the opinion in Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577 (1992), which 
emphasized the coercive quality of the commencement prayer.  Justice Scalia’s dissent vigorously objected 
to treating this passive participation, in a commencement ceremony at which attendance was optional, as 
legally coercive.  Id. at 631–46.  
 201 See, e.g., the recent lawsuit by the ACLU challenging an elective Bible studies course in the 
high schools of Odessa, Texas, described in ACLU Helps Parents Challenge Bible Classes in Texas Public 
Schools, http://www.aclu.org/religion/schools/bibleinpublicschools.html. 
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questionable.  For example, posting the Ten Commandments202 or other, still more 
sectarian messages, on school house walls203 may not be seen by judges as inflicting a 
“personal” injury within a narrowing, post-Hein conception of Article III.204 
 The Supreme Court’s decisions about government-sponsored religious expression 
outside of public schools are a notorious mess, full of splintered opinions205 and deeply 
uncertain guidance for the lower courts.  Perhaps a rejection of “observer standing,” or 
other exceptional bases for standing in Establishment Clause cases, would have been 
salutary if it had occurred before the Court began deciding such cases in 1984.206  Indeed, 
in retrospect, abstaining from such adjudication might have been prudential in its own 
way, leaving to community politics the set of difficult questions that Justice Breyer 
rightly labels as divisive—no matter which way they are decided— in his dispositive 
                                                 
202 Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39 (1980). 
 
203 See, e.g., Washegesic v. Bloomingdale Pub. Sch., 33 F.3d 679, 682–83 (6th Cir. 1994) 
(graduated student has standing to sue over painting of Jesus hanging in hallway of public school, because 
student continued to visit the school and had girlfriend who attended the school). 
 
 204 Plaintiffs will rely in the alternative on taxpayer status in all of these cases involving religious 
expression by government, but some involve no public expenditure, or at least no marginal increase in 
public expenditure.  (Recall that the Court in Doremus dismissed the suit because the complaint about Bible 
reading was aimed at the practice itself, rather than at the payment of a salary to the teacher who led the 
practice.  Doremus v. Bd. Of Educ. of Borough of Hawthorne, 342 U.S. 429, 434 (1952)).  Still other cases 
that do involve traceable expenditures may fail under Hein’s distinction between legislative and executive 
action.  If only executive officials, such as superintendents, principals, and teachers, rather than elected 
school boards, have authorized the challenged practices, Hein would appear to exclude taxpayer standing.  
Opportunities for collusion —school board members quietly encouraging executive personnel to promote 
religion in school— seem ripe in such a legal environment.  Moreover, the Seventh Circuit’s disposition of 
Hinrichs, discussed in Part V.C. above, shows that purely legislative action may not be a basis for taxpayer 
standing, even if the legislature has provided financial support for the challenged practice. 
 
205   Allegheny County v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573 (1989); Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677 (2005).  
For criticism of the “endorsement” test that has come to dominate lower court treatment of such disputes, 
see Steven D. Smith, Symbols, Perceptions, and Doctrinal Illusions: Establishment eutrality and the "o 
Endorsement" Test, 86 MICH. L. REV. 266, 276 (1987). 
 
206  Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668 (1984). 
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concurring opinion in Van Orden v. Perry.207  But we have severe doubts that this sort of 
exercise of “passive virtues,”208 however appropriate it may have been ex ante, is now 
capable of producing a sensible resolution of such controversies.  Once cats like the 
doctrine of non-endorsement209 are out of the bag, and perch in the legal system adjacent 
to competing doctrines of the permissibility of public acknowledgement of our religious 
traditions,210 the terms of substantive constitutional debate have been determined.  Now 
that courts have put such terms in place, a sudden retreat to a posture of non-justiciability 
of cases of this character may well lead to bitterness and recrimination, rather than to a 
constitutional discourse appropriately leavened by local conditions and political 
flexibility. 
VIII. A ROLE FOR THE STATE COURTS? 
 All that has been said so far applies only to the federal courts.  In some states, the 
law is considerably more receptive to taxpayer suits than is the law of Article III.211  A 
wholesale retreat from taxpayer standing in the federal courts in Establishment Clause 
cases may thus lead plaintiffs to the doors of the state courts in search of an alternative 
                                                 
207 545 U.S. 677, 698–705 (2005) (Breyer, J., concurring in the judgment to permit the Ten 
Commandments monument to remain on the grounds of the courthouse and other state governmental 
buildings in Texas). 
 
208 See ALEXANDER BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH 111–198 (Bobbs-Merrill Co., 
1962) (advocating judicial use of the “passive virtues” associated with doctrines of non-justiciability to 
avoid politically difficult contexts for constitutional adjudication). 
 
209   Lynch, 465 U.S. at 687–94 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (introducing the “endorsement” test 
into Establishment Clause adjudication of publicly-sponsored religious displays). 
 
210   Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1, 33–45 (2004) (O’Connor, J., 
concurring) (defending the state-sponsored recital in public schools of the words “under God” in the Pledge 
of Allegiance as acknowledging the role of religious belief in the founding of the United States). 
 
 211  See, e.g., Saratoga County Chamber of Commerce, Inc. v. Pataki, 798 N.E. 2d 1047, 1052–53 
(N.Y. 2003) (describing broad theory of taxpayer standing as part of common law of New York).   In 
contrast, we very much doubt that state law is currently more receptive than the law of Article III to suits 
by offended observers of government-sponsored displays, religious or otherwise.  
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forum. 
 In theory, state courts must be open to assertions of violation of federal law on the 
same terms as state courts are otherwise open to hear state law claims.212   For a variety 
of reasons, however, state courts are unlikely to be hospitable forums for suits brought 
under the Establishment Clause.  Many state court judges are elected, or are subject to 
electoral recall, and the political unpopularity of many Establishment Clause claims may 
well make state judges reluctant to apply existing constitutional principles with vigor.213  
Moreover, state courts may lack authority to award attorneys’ fees in such cases.  The 
possibility of such awards to prevailing parties in the federal courts is an important part 
of the dynamic of Establishment Clause litigation,214 in which local counsel can 
sometimes persuade elected officials that constitutional recalcitrance may be quite 
expensive.  Thus, the availability of state courts to hear such claims is no guarantee that 
Establishment Clause norms will be adequately enforced. 
 If state courts do become the only available forum for these cases, the dilemma of 
non-uniformity looms.   Retreat from broad norms of Establishment Clause standing, 
without comparable retreat from broad substantive norms under the Clause, is 
functionally equivalent to a congressional withdrawal of jurisdiction from the federal 
                                                 
 212 Testa v. Katt, 330 U.S. 386 (1947).  The obligation may be even broader.  See generally Nicole 
Gordon & Douglas Gross, Justiciability of Federal Claims in State Court, 59 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 145 
(1984). 
 213 See generally Burt Neuborne, The Myth of Parity, 90 HARV. L. REV. 1105 (1977). 
 214 Forces opposed to Establishment Clause litigation recently tried to get Congress to remove 
such cases from the general statutory scheme governing award of attorneys’ fees to prevailing parties in 
constitutional litigation in the federal courts.  Public Expression of Religion Act of 2005, H.R. 2679, 109th 
Cong. (2005).  For discussion of the political context of the proposal, see Claire Hughes, Proposed Law 
Would Limit Church-State Lawsuits, Roundtable on Religion and Social Welfare Policy, June 27, 2006, 
http://www.religionandsocialpolicy.org/news/article.cfm?id=4459.  The law received a favorable vote in 
the House but did not come up in the Senate. 
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courts.  In such a scenario, federal courts are removed from the picture, but substantive 
federal law remains.  When appropriately called upon to do so, state courts are duty-
bound under the Supremacy Clause to apply the pre-existing law of the Establishment 
Clause.215  But the content of those norms is highly contested,216 and even those state 
courts operating in utmost fidelity to the rule of law will not necessarily apply such 
norms in a uniform way.   
 If Article III precludes federal court adjudication of Establishment Clause claims 
brought by taxpayers, or ultimately by observers of displays, and state law permits state 
courts to proceed to the merits of such cases, Supreme Court review of conflicts on these 
issues among the state courts may be precluded.217  Just as the skittishness of state court 
judges may undermine the supremacy of federal law, the loss of a unifying federal voice 
in these matters may eventually subvert the uniformity of federal law as well.218  
                                                 
 215 Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 4 (1958) (Supremacy Clause binds state officials to follow 
Supreme Court interpretations of the Constitution). 
 
216 For a recent and elegant account of that contest, see Steven Gey, Life After the Establishment 
Clause, 110 W. Va.. L. Rev. 1 (2007) (forthcoming, November 2007). 
 217 See Tileston v. Ullman, 318 U.S. 44, 46 (1943) (per curiam) (dismissing appeal from state 
court decision on the merits of federal constitutional question on ground that the state court plaintiff lacked 
standing to litigate the question in the federal court).  Tileston involved an attempt to obtain a declaratory 
judgment of unconstitutionality with respect to Connecticut’s law against use of birth control devices.  The 
Supreme Court eventually struck down the Connecticut law in Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 481 
(1965), in which the Court recognized the standing of doctors, defending against a criminal prosecution,  to 
raise the constitutional rights of their patients. 
 218 See generally ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION §§ 3.1–3.3 (4th ed. 2003); Daniel 
J. Meltzer, The History and Structure of Article III, 138 U. PA. L. REV. 1569 (1990); Akhil Amar, A eo-
Federalist View of Article III: Separating the Two Tiers of Federal Jurisdiction, 65 B.U. L. REV. 205 
(1985); Laurence Sager, Constitutional Limits on Congress’ Ability to Regulate the Jurisdiction of the 
Federal Courts, 95 HARV. L. REV. 17 (1981) (arguing that Art. III requires that some federal forum be 
available for the enforcement of federal constitutional rights). A phenomenon roughly comparable to what 
we describe in text has begun to arise under the Guarantee Clause, U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4.  The Supreme 
Court long ago held that claims under the Clause are non-justiciable in the federal courts, see Pacific States 
Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Oregon, 223 U.S. 118, 143–150 (1911), but a number of state courts have entertained 
such claims.  In re Interrogatories, 536 P.2d 308 (Colo. 1975) (Guarantee clause is justiciable in state 
court); Van Sickle v. Shanahan, 511 P.2d 223 (Kan. 1973) (same).  But see State ex rel. Huddleston v. 
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Whatever one’s view of the Establishment Clause, these consequences cannot be seen as 
salutary for either religious freedom or the constitutional system as a whole. 
 COCLUSIO 
 Hein is fully subject to the dictum of ordinary language philosophy that no 
decision can tell you how to read it.  The terms of engagement seem obvious, but the full 
pattern that will develop in the lower courts is for now unknowable.  What seems evident 
is that Hein has narrowed the needle of justiciability on which so much Establishment 
Clause doctrine rests.  Moreover, the campaign to narrow the role of courts in enforcing 
the Clause is not likely to come to a halt when the question involves the status of injuries 
other than those associated with taxpayers.  Government lawyers, once awakened to these 
possibilities, will press them strenuously, and many judges will be receptive to the 
opportunity to avoid the merits of these difficult and notoriously divisive disputes. 
 If the ball of Establishment Clause doctrine is to be deflated, the constitutional 
system would be far better served if courts faced the issues squarely, and resolved them 
on their merits.  It is one thing for courts to systematically and continuously avoid 
adjudication of matters better left to political branches —the scope of war powers, for 
example, where the courts have interfered very reluctantly and infrequently with 
questions of presidential versus congressional authority to commit troops to battle.219  
                                                                                                                                                 
Sawyer, 932 P.2d 1145, 1160 (Or. 1997) (Guarantee Clause not justiciable in state court).   See generally, 
Michael C. Dorf, The Relevance of Federal Norms for State Separation of Powers, 4 Roger Williams U. L. 
Rev. 51, 59-67 (1998).  Such decisions by the highest state courts are unreviewable in the U.S. Supreme 
Court.  The situation described in the text is different, because (unlike the context of the Guarantee Clause) 
the Supreme Court has already developed elaborate standards under the Establishment Clause.  If some 
state court decisions under the Establishment Clause are unreviewable in the federal courts, those state 
decisions may contradict one another and may also contradict Supreme Court precedent that purportedly 
controls.  See Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 18 (1958) (characterizing Supreme Court decisions as the 
“supreme Law of the Land” within the meaning of the Supremacy Clause, U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2). 
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Establishment Clause adjudication, however, is much different because minority interests 
are frequently at stake and because the courts have developed an elaborate body of 
governing norms.  These norms have resided for a generation or more in the 
constitutional system, but they are not self-enforcing.  Without the threat of judicial 
enforcement, they are likely to wither.  
 If the judiciary, led by the Supreme Court, is going to dismantle the current 
structure of non-establishment law, it should do so straightforwardly, and not by stealthy 
attacks along the front of justiciability.  That form of battle is profoundly destabilizing.  It 
threatens religious liberty, and it invites continued disrespect to the rule of law from 
decision-makers who believe they are safe from expensive lawsuits, even if they blatantly 
ignore prior judicial pronouncements on the meaning of the Constitution.  Hein is an 
early step down a perilous path. 
                                                                                                                                                 
219 For competing views of this question, compare JOHN HART ELY, WAR AND RESPONSIBILITY: 
CONSTITUTIONAL LESSONS OF VIETNAM AND ITS AFTERMATH (1993) (arguing for a strenuous judicial role 
in limiting abuse of the executive’s war-making powers) with Abraham Sofaer, The Power Over War, 50 
U. MIAMI. L. REV. 33 (1995) (arguing that such questions should be left to battles over power and policy 
between the political branches, and that courts should stay out of such conflicts). 
